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Introduction
This paper is concerned with an investigation of the effectiveness 
of a particular mechanism of the planning process which has two main 
functions: the collection of information and the resolution of conflict. 
That mechanism is the public inquiry.
The investigation will be undertaken using a particular case study:
The Drumbuie Public Inquiry.
The conflict arose in this case when developers applied for planning 
permission to prepare a site on the North-West coast of Scotland for 
the construction of concrete oil production platforms. The sort of 
conflict that arose has become increasingly common over the last 
few years, highlighted by the requests to exploit copper in Snowdonia 
and produce aluminium on Anglesey, both in the late sixties. In simple 
terms the conflict arises in these cases when the need (however defined) 
for more resources impinges on the less material aspirations which have 
become to be known as the "quality of life".
The public inquiry is a process which has been developed to facilitate 
the disciplined clash of views and ideas; conflict regulated by 
procedures which are set down in law.
The Chairman of :a public inquiry (in Scotland known as the reporter) 
is appointed by the Secretary of State. The developer and the principal 
objectors in complex cases will often be represented by Counsel, though 
the principles of the procedure are quite simple. It is usual for 
the developers? case to be advanced first by means of expert witnesses 
who are cross-examined by the objectors or their Counsel. When all the 
parties have been heard, each party is allowed to sum up his case before 
the reporter submits his report to the Secretary of State.
This system works best if both sides are equally well informed. 
However, the developer holds the initiative; he may as the system strands
at the moment only choose to release information if and when it will 
help his case. Forecasts made by the developer who seeks to establish 
the need for the project may be overly respected because the developer 
is seen as having a financial interest in accuracy. The public inquiry 
may be seen as an effective method of establishing and evaluating con-
\
flicts caused by developers' proposals but when these proposals raise 
difficult technical or policy issues the public inquiry may not be able 
to cope with the broader implications.
The public inquiry thus operates in a political setting - it is part 
of a process which makes decisions about the uses to which the communi­
ties' resources shall be put and it influences the allocation of costs.
A developer at a public inquiry is not primarily concerned with the 
total costs that his project incurs for the community as a whole. His 
objective is more simply to minimise the private costs that fall upon 
his own budget and which he himself must bear.
Within this climate the public inquiry based as it is on the principles 
of openness, fairness and impartiality, can only be part of the decision 
making process. Its function is to "inform the Minister's mind". It 
is the Minister, responsible to Parliament, who takes the final decision 
for or against a proposal on the basis of a value judgment by one or 
more politicians or more properly by the application of policy to the 
facts of a particular case.
The Drumbuie inquiry generated recommendations for the improvement 
of the public inquiry process. Through a review of these proposals, in 
the light of the case study, the effectiveness of the public inquiry as 
a process in decision-making will be the concern of this paper.
CHAPTER 1 THE LOCAL PLANNING CONTEXT
Ross and Cromarty County Planning Department received formal 
applications for outline planning permission to construct concrete 
oil production platforms at Port Cam from Mowlem and Taylor Woodrow 
on 13th April 1973 and l6th April 1973 respectively.
The concrete oil production platforms they proposed to build were 
massive and would have a considerable impact on the local environment.
"Condeep" for instance (an abbreviated form of concrete deepwater 
structure) is a Norwegian design for which Mowlem hold the U.K. 
licence. ."Condeep" uses reinforced and prestressed concrete and 
consists of 19 base cells each oblong in shape and standing 
vertically - these cells are joined together in construction and 
"slipformed" as a complete unit. This process takes about seven 
months. The cellular base is then towed out of the dry dock in 
which it has been constructed and anchored in 70-80 metres of 
sheltered water. At this second stage the base is completed and 
the concrete towers are fitted. These towers stand on the cellular 
base and contain the pipes which connect the well head with the 
production deck of the platform. This second stage of the operation 
takes approximately eleven months to complete and at the peak of 
activity the construction programme will require 5»000 tons of 
aggregate, 800 tons of cement and 500 tons of reinforcing steel, 
per week. The project involved not only the use of a particular site 
for which planning permission was sought but also the movement of 
large quantities of raw materials which would increase the impact 
of the development. The third and final stage of the construction 
process involves the towing of the platform from its stage 2 site in 
70-80 metres of water to a stage 3 site of 200 metres depth. There
the platform is ballasted down, tested and the prefabricated 
production deck which sits on top of the concrete towers is 
installed. The first platform Mowlem estimates will take about 
27 months to complete. Thereafter when the site is fully operational 
the construction time will be shortened to about 24 months. The 
weight of the platforms will be about 175,000 tonnes and to build 
structures of this bulk it is estimated by Mowlem that the site 
will require delivery of about 190,000 tons of aggregate a year 
30,000 tons of cement a year and 20,000 tons of reinforcing steel 
a year.
The planning applications filed independently by the two construc­
tion companies indicated site areas which overlapped to a 
considerable extent. The site at Port Cam (see map) is approximately 
300 yards to the north west of the village of Drumbuie and adjacent 
to the Dingwall-Kyle railway. Mowlem's site occupies 95 acres 
of which 42 acres is below the High Water Mark and Taylor Woodrow's 
site is 140 acres of which 50 acres is below the High Water Mark.
The Ross and Cromarty Development Plan had been approved by the 
Secretary of State on 22nd October 1964; the proposed site at Port 
Cam was shown as "white land" i.e. it was not zoned for any type 
of development. The Planning Department would presume that in such 
a situation the land would continue in its existing use, i.e. 
crofting land. For the project to gain planning permission the 
Secretary of State would have to approve an "Article 5M direction 
which would change the zoning of the site to "industrial use".
However to the local authority in land use terms alone the 
development was seen as incompatible with the existing situation.
On 29th March 1975 the County Planning Officer had submitted a 
preliminary report on a South West Ross strategy to the planning 
and development committee. This report stated that the townships
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of Drumbuie and Duirinish should be designated as conservation 
areas and that consideration should be given to designating further 
areas of great landscape value in the South West district.
Since the County Development Plan had been approved the buildings 
of Drumbuie and Duirnish had been included in the statutory list 
of buildings of architectural and historic interest and the whole of 
the townships had been designated Group ’A ’ category by the Secretary 
of State.
The site is within an area marked on the county map as being of 
special scenic attraction. Though the designation appears to cover 
the majority of the West coa£t and is not linked ■ to any specific 
policy in the written statement.
Proposals in the Development Plan for Drumbuie include the 
provision of mains drainage, increased holiday catering, crofting 
re-organisation and state forestry, and for the adjoining township 
of Duirnish, crofting re-organisation and state forestry. A 
specific proposal to establish a beach picnic area at Port Cam was 
approved by the County Planning and Development Committee on l6th 
October 1972 but the proposals are still being reviewed by the 
Scottish Development Department and the Countryside Commission.
This brief review of the nature of the project and of the local 
planning authorities’ approstfilh to South West Ross serve to show 
that an application for planning permission for this project would 
completely alter the scope and context of planning activity in the 
area.
The County Planning Officer was first informed of the possible 
fabrication of concrete oil production platforms in Loch Carron, at 
a meeting convened by the H.I.D.B. in Inverness on 29th November 
1972. Also present were representatives of the Countryside Commission,
The crofters Commission, National Trust for Scbtland and John 
Mowlem and Company. The H.I.D.B. had arranged this discussion 
"with a view to ensuring that the Company were made fully aware 
of any problems raised by their proposals.u (H.I.D.B. press release 
8th December 1972) This meeting,held at a very early stage in the 
formation of the proposals, was the only time that representatives 
from the local planning authorities, the developers and environmental 
groups (who were later to come forward as objectors) met before 
the public inquiry was initiated ten months later.
In early January 1973 the County Planning Officer received from 
Taylor Woodrow a copy of their letter dated 9th January 1973 to 
the National Trust for Scotland, indicating that they were interested 
in fabricating concrete platforms on a site near Drumbuie. In 
the middle of March 1973 representatives of Taylor Woodrow met 
officials from the County Planning Department to discuss the 
proposals.
On 2Ath March 1973 the National Trust organised a public meeting 
at Kyle which was attended by the County Planning Officer who 
indicated that if applications were received there would be further 
opportunity for public consultation. On 13th April 1973 the County 
Planning Officer received a copy letter from the National Trust to 
the County Clerk indicating that the Council and Executive had 
decided to oppose any application for the use of building site£ 
in the Drumbuie area.
Applications for planning permission were submitted by Taylor 
Woodrow and Mowlem in the middle of April (as noted above). The 
applications for planning permission in principle only were 
submitted on the standard County Council application form. Quesstion
2 on the form asked for particulars of the proposal and was split 
into 8 subquestions. Mowlems managed to answer this question in 
less than 50 words. Questions 3 and 4 asked for particular details 
about buildings and waste discharge etc. In reply Mowlems stated 
that the applications were for permission in principle only and that 
.details would be supplied later. Qutestion 5 asked for ’’Any other 
notes relevant to the application”. To which Mowlems replied: 
"Application is made for permission to use this particular site in 
view of the unique sheltered deep-water facilities in close proxi­
mity to existing rail, road and air (communications. The development 
will comprise a dry basin, workshops., storage areas and accommodation 
with facilities for approximately 80(0 persons.”
The County Planning Department had sent the developers a standard 
industrial questionnaire which they meceived completed from Mowlem 
on 24th April 1973 an-J from Taylor Woodrow on 23rd May 1973* The 
questionnaire included 14 questions vwhich sought more information 
on particular aspects of the proposal - choice of site, nature of 
operations, labour force, traffic generation, precautions for fire, 
water supplies, site expansion and construction, processes and 
effluents, noise, storage of materials, development below High Water 
Mark, electricity supply and details about the construction camp.
In answer to question 14 on housing Mowlems stated "It is not 
anticipated that houses would be prowided on the site." - a direct 
contradiction to the information they/- supplied on the application 
form (see above).
The receipt of the two applications* was reported to the Planning 
and Development Committee on 24th Aprhi.1 1973* The Committee agreed 
that the applications should be dealt: with in the normal way and 
that if approved by the County Council as local planning authority
they should be the subject of a formal amendment to the Development 
Plan for submission to the Secretary of State. (If approved by the 
Secretary of State the amendment would formally be instituted using 
an Article 5 direction order).
On l8th May the County Planning Officer attended a meeting in 
Inverness with S.D.D. and H.I.D.B. A few weeks earlier a firm of 
consultants, Sphere, had been commissioned by S.D.D. to prepare an 
impact analysis of the Drumbuie proposals (see chapter 5)« The 
purpose of this meeting was to agree a brief for the impact analysis, 
Representatives of the National Trust, the Countryside Commission,
Taylor Woodrow and Mowlem were not invited to the meeting.
On 11th June responsibility for a decision on the application was 
removed from the local authority. The application had been called 
in by the Secretary of State (for more details on the calling in 
procedure see chapter 2). However the local authority had not concluded 
their own deliberations on the project. On 26th June 1973 the 
County Planning Officer submitted to the Planning and Development 
Committee an interim report indicating the replies to the consultations 
carried out on the two applications. It is indicative of the quality 
of the information thus far submitted by the applicants that many 
of the replies received from other chief officers of the County 
Council were not definite pronouncements on the applications but 
requests for further information.
At the beginning of October the County Council received a copy of 
the Sphere report which was circulated amongst the councillors. On 
22nd October 1973 a special meeting of the Planning and Development 
Committee and the County Council was convened to determine the formal 
views of the County Council to be conveyed to the Secretary of State.
The meeting decided to recommend that the County Council oppose the
proposal. "The County Council are concerned to oppose the 
applications, inter alia, in consideration of the adverse social, 
environmental and economic effects on the community. They have 
also had regard to the impracticality of providing the necessary 
infrastructure." (letter from County Clerk to the Secretary of 
State 26th October 1973)
Normally an application for planning permission is decided by 
the local planning authority on the basis of a proposal's compat­
ibility with the provisions of the Development Plan and to some 
extent on its compatibility with existing development in the area.
From the local authority standpoint these applications were completely 
foreign to the provisions of the Development Plan for South West 
Ross and were incompatible in planning terms with existing 
development. Technically it was perfectly feasible that the local 
authority could take a decision on this development albeit on an 
ad hoc basis. However, the intervention of the Secretary of State 
relieved them of that responsibility when he decided to institute 
a public inquiry into the applications. This chapter has served 
as an introduction to the main concern of this paper - an evaluation 
of the public inquiry process applied to the Drumbuie applications 
and a consideration of the changes which are being devised to 
 ^affect the efficiency of that process.
Many of the problems which arose while the applications were 
being handled by the local planning authority, lack of accurate 
information and of policies with which to assess the compatibility 
of the projects with the existing situation, were to arise when 
the applications were considered at the higher level.
CHAPTER 2 ' PLANNING INQUIRY PROCEDURE '
On the 11th June 1973 the applications for planning permission for 
the proposed erection of oil rig construction platforms at Port Cam, 
Drumbuie, submitted by Taylor Woodrow and Howlen to Ross and Cromarty 
County Council were acted upon by the Secretary of State for Scotland. 
Under Section 32 subsection 1 of the Town and Country Planning 
(Scotland) Act 1972 the Secretary of State has the authority to "call 
in" certain types of applications , thus relieving the local planning 
authority of its responsibility to make a decision on those planning 
applications the Secretary of State feels are more appropriately 
dealt with at Central Government level.
The exercise of "call in" powers by a Secretary of State is a 
relatively rare occurrence which adds weight to the realisation that 
these applications affecting Port Cam were of special significance. 
There are no figures for Scotland, but in England the number of 
applications affected by the call in procedure in 1968 was 100 out of 
a total of *+26,286 (DoE 197^a)• The kinds of cases which are "called 
in" were described in evidence to the Select Committee of the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration as being of six main
types:-
(1) cases of strong political and public interest
(2) cases of pending disagreement between local authorities as to
whether one is allowed to build in another area
(3) major local controversy, such as the introduction of industry 
to a small country town, totally altering the character of the place
1
S32(l) "The Secretary of State may give directions requiring appli­
cations for planning permission, or the approval of any local 
planning authority required under a development order, to be referred 
to him instead of being dealt with by local planning authorities."
(*+) cases affecting a wide area
(5) cases involving development in a National Park
(6) cases involving an infringement of major policy, such as Green 
Belt arrangements.
The nature of the proposed development was such that it was already 
apparent that if fell into categories 1 and 3 above, and as the 
subsequent public inquiry proceeded it became relevant to category *+ 
and indeed (though not explicitly because of the nature of planning 
policy in the area - see Chapter l) eventually was affected by 
categories 5 and 6.
'When the Secretary of State acts under the "call in" procedure he
is bound by the 1972 Act to notify the local authority and the
applicants of his reasons for so doing. Essentially he gave his 
reasons as being firstly that Port Cam may be an area of "environmental 
sensitivity", and as such "there may arise the question of the balance 
of advantage in the national interest, of developing particular sites 
against the environmental cost of so doing"; and secondly that "In this 
case the proposals are in an area of national recreation and landscape 
significance. The adjacent water is unusually deep; the site is remote 
from urban development and the proposals could have an effect on a 
wide range of the present social, economic and physical features of 
the area and of the areas adjacent to it including the County of
Inverness." As befits a statement which was to precede a public
inquiry the reasons given are deliberately phrased in an impartial 
fashion. The huge significance for National Policy and the inter- 
Government Departmental conflict which was to become apparent at the 
inquiry was euphemistically hidden in the bland use of the term 
"national interest" by the Secretary of State.
The "call in" statement by the Secretary of State does not neces­
sarily initiate the public inquiry procedure, however the extent of 
the objections to this application were such that the Secretary of 
State had no option but to set the Public Inquiry mechanism in motion. 
(387 separate objections)
The Public Inquiry as a way of seeking to resolve conflict in 
administrative decision making originated in the 19th century and was 
first applied to planning in the 1909 Planning Act. As life has 
become more complex the State was compelled to intervene increasingly 
in the affairs of its citizens and to hold the balance between the 
public and private good. The Public Inquiry was the method by which 
it sought to achieve this end.
Parliament has remained sensitive to individual rights and especially 
sensitive to power exercised through delegated legislation. In order 
to cope with the tremendous amount of business taken on, parliament 
must increasingly delegate to Ministers and in turn to the officials. 
Delegated decision making on the scale that is necessary would only be 
thought tolerable if those adversely affected were allowed to say 
their piece. Accordingly the law makes provision to deal with conflict 
which may arise between an individual or group on the one hand and 
executive action by a public authority or government department on 
the other. In the field of public inquiries the emphasis in most cases 
is on appeal or in this case objection, but the outcome is that the 
Minister responsible informs himself by investigation on the spot before 
reaching his decision.
The public inquiry is an important part of the relationship between 
an individual and authority. Although, as will be seen in this case, 
they are not the means of decision making; they represent an important 
step in decision making by attempting to "inform the Minister's mind"
of the arguments, the interested parties are employing to press their ^  
respective cases in as full a way as possible. Theoretically, at the 
end of the inquiry, the Minister is then able to make an informed 
decision, Whether the Minister has made a "just" or even acceptable 
decision depends not only on the effectiveness of the inquiry process 
but also on the considerations he has to be aware of outside the 
inquiry - departmental and government policy in particular. In 
this case government policy was not explicitly clear and the scale of 
the decision was such that it subsequently affected Government policy 
(see Chapter 7)* The acceptability of the public inquiry process 
can to a certain extent be ensured by the existence of rules which 
the inquiry must follow but rules can only be procedural and not 
substantive. Dissatisfaction is most likely to occur for the interested 
parties after the Reporter has submitted his recommendations; what 
happens during this crucial period when the decision is actually made 
is not made public. When this stage is reached the interested parties 
no longer have the facilities available to directly influence the 
Minister.
For Public Inquiries to effectively perform their function it is 
essential that the public must accept the process and have confidence 
in it. In 195^ this public confidence was adversely affected; the then 
Minister of Agriculture, Sir Thomas Dugdale, was forced to resign 
through the alleged maladministration surrounding the Crichel Down 
affair and its public enquiry. At that time a barrister wrote "The 
real complaint in planning inquiries and the like is not that the 
inspectors fail to make proper reports but that their recommendations 
are sometimes overruled. The lesson from Crichel Down is rather this; 
that too many sorts of official action directly affecting the legitimate 
interests of individuallpiembers of the public are taken informally
without use of the machinery of public inquiry and decision upon 
the ensuing rpport - and that there is no telling, where decisions 
are taken informally, whether the material facts were ever considered 
at all."
Mindful of the damage this incident had done to the credibility 
of public inquiries , the Lord High Chancellor appointed in 1955 
a committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries. Known as 
the Pranks Committee the report they prepared was presented to 
Parliament in 1957 (Lord High Chancellor 1957).
The Franks report stressed the importance of the procedures laid 
down for inquiries in that they must promote good administration. 
"Administration must not only be efficient in the sense that the 
objectives of policy are securely attained without delay. It must 
also satisfy the general body of citizens that it is proceeding with 
reasonable regard to the balance between the public interest which 
it promotes and the private interest which it disturbs. Parliament 
has, we infer, intended in relation to the subject matter of our 
terms of reference that the further decisions or, as they may 
rightly be termed in this context, adjudications must be acceptable 
as having been properly made."
The report laid great stress on three characteristics of public 
inquiries which must be upheld, openness - otherwise the basis of 
confidence and acceptability would be lacking; fairness - if the 
objector were not allowed to state his case there would be nothing 
to stop oppression; and impartiality - otherwise how can the citizen 
be satisfied unless he feels that those who decide his case come to 
their decision with open minds?
The report opened up three long-standing debates involving public
inquiries whether the reporters submission to the Secretary of State 
should be published or not, whether the nature of the provisions 
for public inquiries made them judicial or administrative and whether 
the reporters should be independent or drawn from departmental civil 
servants. There are several other issues which have been or are 
contentious but the above three are more long-standing and between 
them bring in the controversial arguments of a wider nature on 
planning inquiries.
Firstly publication of the reports; Franks was mindful that non­
publication meant that the interested parties did not know what 
the reporter had said, whether they would have agreed with this 
statement of the facts, what advice he had offered to the Minister 
and whether the Minister had accepted it or not. The Committee were 
clearly anxious that appellants, though unable to question policy, 
should at least be satisfied that policy was being implemented on 
the basis of agreed facts. There are three principal arguments 
against publication however, the inspector’s report was only one 
of the considerations that the Minister had to take into account 
in reaching a decision, the others being concerned with national 
policy; to publish it, while not publishing evidence of any other 
kind, would be misleading c.nd might make publication worse instead 
of better. Secondly it would be embarrassing for the Minister to 
have to disagree publicly with the inspector's recommendations. 
Thirdly the inspectors may not be as frank if reports are published. 
The committee recommended publication of the reports, this has since 
been implemented and with implementation these arguments against 
publication appear to have dissipated.
The public inquiry to essentially an administrative process, yet 
to members of the public it may appear to be a judicial occasion;
especially when they see it as two or more parties appearing before 
a judge-like reporter and stating their case to him in public. This 
impression can be heightened in the more important public inquiries 
involving distinguished "experts" and Q.C.s. The proceedings then 
tend to become more formal and cross-examination is sharper. It is 
up to the reporter to ensure that the people involved are not 
intimidated by the spectacle, and receive a fair hearing. The 
decision is not made at the public inquiry. When the decision is made 
it is by a Minister responsible only to Parliament and is involved 
in the furtherance of the processes of Government. As such the 
procedure cannot be considered a judicial one.
There has for long been an argument over the merits of independent 
reporters. In Scotland the volume of work did not justify employing 
full-time reporters. Reporters are appointed "ad hoc" by the Secretary 
of State, they are given no training, the financial compensation is 
low and if the inquiry is prolonged their own business activities 
may suffer. Franks considered the advantages of an independent 
reporter would be to increase public confidence, especially if the 
proposals came from the Ministry initiating the inquiry; that it 
would be less embarrassing for departments to give oral evidence 
before an independent reporter than before a Department reporter; 
and that independence gave the reporter a licence to freer comment 
in his report.
On the other hand the case for Departmental reporters is that the 
reporter is more likely to be aware of departmental policy; that the 
number of inquiries to be arranged make it essential to have full­
time reporters (this argument has only recently become a valid one); 
and technical considerations may be easier for a full time employee 
constantly concerned with these matters. (Scottish Office has since
set up a full time reporters unit - see 1975 memo).
At Drumbuie an independent reporter, Ron Bennett, Q.C., was aided 
in technical matters by a technical assessor. (Government policy was 
not made clear at the inquiry with the result that discussions on it 
were confused and contradictory.) "Government policies must be known 
if the reporter is to rely on them as his framework of reference." 
(Franks report). The case study will attempt to show the difficulty 
involved in an inquiry when the reporter is not fully informed on 
Government policy and where separate departments turn in conflicting 
statements.
The Franks report led to the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 under 
which many of Franks recommendations were accepted. Inquiry and 
reporters' reports were to be published and in Scotland a standing 
committee was set up to review the activities of Tribunals and 
Inquiries. This legislation led to Statutory Instruments being 
prepared to regularise the procedures: the Drumbuie Inquiry was 
affected by Statutory Instrument No 1092 1969 (Town and Country 
Planning (inquiries Procedure) Rules 1969).
Within two months of the original application to the local planning 
authority the Secretary of State must notify the local authority and 
the applicant if he intends to "call in" the application. He must 
give at least 42 days' notice to the Local Planning Authority and 
all section 36 parties (owners and agricultural tenants) if he 
decides to hold a public inquiry, informing them of the date, time 
and place of the inquiry.
Not later than 28 days before the inquiry is due to take place the 
Secretary of State must provide the applicant,.thh local planning 
authority and section 36 parties with a written statement of the 
reasons for his direction.
The local authority is required to provide through the Secretary 
of State to the applicants a list of the names and addresses of 
every section 36 party; it is also required to provide the Secretary 
of State with the same information and the name and address of all 
persons who have made representations to the local planning authority. 
The Secretary of State may require the local authority to publish 
notices of the inquiry in the local newspapers, to serve notices to 
specific persons and to post notices on the land in question.
Not later than 28 days before the inquiry the Secretary of State 
may require the local authority to submit a written statement of 
its proposed submission to the applicant and to the Secretary of 
State. The authority may be required to make available for 
inspection documents relevant to the inquiry. Similarly the 
applicants may be required to make available a written statement 
of the submissions which he intends to put forward at the inquiry.
Who may appear at the inquiry? The applicant, the local authority, 
section 36 parties and any person the Secretary of State may require 
to attend, plus "any other person may appear at the inquiry at the 
discretion of the appointed person" (Section 36 1972 (Scotland) Act).
In practice it is very unusual for a reporter to refuse to give an 
interested party a hearing at the inquiry.
Representation of Government Departments became a complex problem 
at Drumbuie. Franks recommended that their evidence should be made 
available in the statement at the beginning of the inquiry. "The 
evidence to be required of such witnesses should however be confined 
to factual matters as opposed to policy matters, and the reporter 
should ensure the distinction is observed." Departments are generally 
disinclined to give evidence at inquiries. They fear that once in 
the witness box, official witnesses might be drawn into major questions 
of policy, which it is the function of Ministers and not of officials
to discuss and defend. It is further argued that "the collective
✓
responsibility of Ministers makes it constitutionally inappropriate 
for witnesses from one department to give evidence at inquiries 
conducted by another department." At Drumbuie the activities of 
the Department of Trade and Industry (and later the Department 
'of. -Energy ) , were considered by many to be inappropriate leading 
with other factors to the call for a Public Inquiry Commission to 
replace the Public Local Inquiry.
The procedure at the inquiry is a matter largely left to the 
discretion of the reporter. He determines the order of appearance 
of those entitled or permitted to appear. He may take into account 
any written evidence and he may adjourn the inquiry as he sees fit. 
The Reporter may be requested by the applicant or the local authority 
to conduct a site inspection but the parties must not make represent­
ations to him during the visit.
After the inquiry the reporter submits his findings in two parts. 
Part I is his summary of the evidence and findings of fact and Part 
II includes his recommendations. Part I is made available to the 
objectors, the applicants and the local authority; these parties 
may if they so desire make written representations to the Minister 
concerning either disagreement with the finding of fact or to bring 
forward new evidence. On the basis of such representations the 
Secretary of State may re-open the inquiry; in the case of Drumbuie 
this did not happen.
Finally after an unspecified amount of time the Secretary of State 
is required to notify his decision, and his reasons, in writing to 
the applicant, the local planning authority, section 36 parties and 
any person who, having appeared at the inquiry, has asked to be 
notified of the decision.
This chapter has avoided a critical appraisal of the public inquiry 
process. It is intended by way of introduction to the case study 
as a review of the statutorily evolved procedures of the public 
inquiry mechanism. An evaluation of both the procedural and 
substantive aspects of the public inquiry can be more effectively 
dealt with after the case study.
CHAPTER 3 THE CASE STUDY
The purpose of the case study is fourfold:
(a) To review the evidence presented at the Drumbuie public inquiry 
by the applicants.
(b) To assess this evidence in the light of the main objections from 
the National Trust and Ross and Cromarty County Council.
(c) To consider the significance of the involvement of the Department 
of Energy and other quasi-Government Departments. is
(d) In the light of this review of the evidence the final chapters 
will be concerned with an evaluation of public inquiries as an aid 
to decision making and of the proposals to improve their quality and 
efficiency.
Having called in the application the Secretary of State is bound 
to state his reasons for so doing. He did so in the following terms: 
"Such sites and adjacent waters in which construction may take place 
may be in areas of environmental sensitivity of varying degree, 
lienee there may arise the question of the balance of advantage, in 
the National interest, of developing particular sites against the 
environmental cost of so doing. In this case the proposals are in 
an area of national recreation and landscape significance. The 
adjacent water is unusually deep; the site is remote from urban 
development and the proposals could have an effect on a wide range 
of the present social, economic and physical features of the area..." 
(letter 11th June 1973 from Secretary of State to the applicants) 
Clearly the impact of such a development were it to take place 
would be far reaching i& its consequences. The extent to which these 
issues can be fully explored in a planning inquiry was questioned as 
the proceedings evolved.
The stated purpose of a public enquiry is to "inform the Minister's
mind." Clearly the Minister was made aware of the enormity of the 
task in this case - he commissioned an impact study (see chapter 5) 
to evaluate the local considerations. The wider aspects of the 
application concerned with the national interest he decided would 
be inappropriate for discussion at the inquiry, such matters would 
be considered at the Scottish Office after the inquiry. In 
accordance with this attitude the Secretary of State notified the 
applicants, by letter on the 20th August 1973 of five areas of 
interest over which the inquiry could range
(a) the extent to which, if any, alternative sites are available for 
the proposed development and if so what are their comparative 
advantages or disadvantages in relation to Drumbuie.
(b) how incoming workers would be accommodated if the project were 
to go ahead.
(c) the rate of build up of employment.
(d) how materials would be transported to the site.
(e) the source of power and water.
Point (a) is made possible under procedural rules applicable to
Scotland only. It has been suggested (Wraith and Lamb 1971) that
this facility greatly alters the nature of public inquiries in that 
it is implied that the purpose of such an inquiry is to consider in 
general terms how a problem might be solved rather than whether a ^  
particular proposal for a particular site is acceptable. In fact 
the Drumbuie inquiry got seriously bogged down in its attempts to 
give meaningful consideration to the alternative sites proposed 
by the objectors and raises the question of whether or not a public 
inquiry commission (which initiates separate public inquiries for 
each of the sites proposed) would have been more appropriate.
The other points in the list above add up to a narrow conception 
of the factors the Public Inquiry should consider. They are wholly
concerned with the characteristics of the requirements of the 
development at a particular site only. If public inquiries are to 
be improved this is the sort of information the planning authorities 
should have access to before the inquiry is instituted. The inquiry 
should be concerned with an assessment of the likely impact of the 
developer's proposals on an area and not simply with attempts to \/ 
reach greater understanding on the scope of the proposed development. 
It is conceivable that the Secretary of State intended the impact 
analysis he had commissioned to satisfactorily answer the questions 
concerned with the effects of the proposed development on physical 
environment, the social structure and the infrastructure of the site 
and the immediate area, but again the impact study should provide 
a basis for discussion at the inquiry and not simply answers to 
questions concerning such matters (see chapter 5)-
The Public Inquiry into the applications by Taylor Woodrow and 
Mowlem for planning permission in principle only was opened at the 
Balmacara Hotel on November 12th 1973, a full seven months after 
the original applications had been submitted to the County Council.
The Applicants' Case
Taylor Woodrow and Mowlem had decided to apply for planning 
permission to develop Port Cam because in their estimation the site 
was the most suitable for the construction of deep water concrete 
production platforms in the whole of the United Kingdom. However 
its suitability, as will be seen, was assessed on civil engineering 
criteria only. The power and extent of the objections to the 
proposals had arisen because to many individuals and organisations 
the application posed a great threat. Port Cam was recognised by 
the objectors as being on a section of the west coast of the Scottish 
Highlands which is nationally regarded as an area of great beauty.
The site itself was part of a tract of land which had been bequeathed 
to the National Trust and was "inalienable" i.e. land which could 
not be used for any purpose to which the National Trust would object. 
If the National Trust were to object.to the proposals, which they did 
the only way the land could be leased to the developers would be 
for the developers to successfully promote a Private Members Bill 
for which there is no precedent. The County Council objected to the 
proposals in principle and in particular because they considered that 
the extent of the proposed development was incompatible with the 
existing infrastructure of the South West Ross Peninsula.
From the first day of the inquiry arguments for and against the 
development were couched in terms of the National interest. The 
developers considered that it was in the National interest to 
produce the platforms as quickly as possible. The objectors 
argued it was in the National interest that this area of North West 
Scotland should not be open to large-scale industrialisation. The 
Secretary of State had the difficult task of deciding partly on 
the basis of the evidence presented to the reporter and partly on 
consultations with his own staff which conception of the National 
interest to accept.
A Public Inquiry is designed to assess the evidence for and against 
a local planning application in local terms. The extent to which 
the procedure is suitable for the discussion of a case in national 
terms can be more adequately considered in the conclusion of the 
paper.
Despite the consideration of alternative sites the developers 
realised that their application and the primary concern of the 
inquiry was for one particular site;;to be successful the applicants 
would have to convince the reporter that there was an unquestionable 
need to produce production platforms of a particular type at Port Cam
Seeking to make their case more acceptable than if they were merely 
to consider the planning aspects of the application the applicants 
sought to stress the importance of their case in national economic 
terms. If the Port Cam proposal did not proceed, they argued, some 
of the work would go not to other sites in Britain, but for this 
type of platform which requires deep water it would go to foreign 
builders. "The basic assumption is that the Port Cam site has 
advantages for constructing oil platforms which are not found in 
combination anywhere else in this country and I assume that the 
additional costs of producing such platforms at any other location 
would make it significantly more difficult to compete with over­
seas producers - that is in effect Norwegian producers The
platforms might not be lost to Great Britain but this is a very 
competitive site for the concrete platforms that everyone is
demanding we may reasonably suppose that every second platform
built at Port Cam would have to be made abroad if the project does 
not go ahead." (Cox - consultant economist for Taylor Woodrow)
Each platform at 1973 prices was estimated to cost £2© millions - 
Cox estimated that each one would bring £6-7 millions to Scottish 
suppliers; of this £800,000 at the most (including the revenue from 
aggregates) would accrue to South West Ross. He also estimated 
without substantiating that the project would create 1100-1200 jobs 
including 700 jobs on the actual site and a further 100 jobs through
the multiplier effect in South West Ross.
Cox also made rather than evaluated three other points:
(a) The project is an opportunity to establish a British lead in 
the technology of deep water concrete platforms
(b) That the cost of living may be affected by the increased cost
of oil production if the project was refused
(c) That it was in the "country's interest" to get its oil ashore as
quickly as possible.
Evidence led during the inquiry by Gibson of the Department of 
Energy resulted in the Balance of Payments argument being dropped 
by the applicants. Gibson stated that Norway had a production 
capacity of four platforms a year, the majority of which they would 
require for their own use. Secondly even if all the proposed sites 
at present without planning permission in Scotland were to receive 
planning permission he estimated that we would still need to import 
23% of the number of deep water platforms we are likely to require 
within the next few years.
Consequently the developers changed tack in their closing speech 
- There is a trend for deeper oil fields, oil companies have a 
preference for this type of platform. Because Norway can only 
produce one or two platforms a year for British use then there is 
a need for an assured supply of deep-water platforms in the U.K.
The objectors in their closing speech were quick to point out that 
the applicants no longer considered the question of Balance of 
Payments as being as important as they had earlier in the Inquiry.
The U.K. could not hope to build all the platforms it required and 
as Gibson had said 25% of them would probably have to come from 
abroad.
Perhaps the most glaring omission from the Inquiry proceedings was 
the complete lack of evidence from the potential buyers of the 
platforms - the oil companies. If they were keen to purchase British 
built deep-water platforms constructed in concrete then it is rather 
curious that they did not appear at the Inquiry to support the 
applicants' case. The lack of evidence from the potential users 
detracts from the strength of the evidence on the acceptability of 
concrete designs in general and the acceptability of the designs 
involved in the inquiry in particular. Further there was a lack of
quantification of the scope of the penalties the oil industry may 
incur in terms of delay if this development did not proceed.
The memorandum on procedure in force at the time of the inquiry 
(St. Andrews House 1958) stated that the reporter should be made aware 
of Government policy. But what was Government policy? The Depart*..: t 
ment: of. Energyr were to make their position perfectly plain but 
the overall Government policy remained unclear to other than 
Governmental participants (see chapter 7). Hodgson, the opening 
witness for the applicants, could only give his opinion that the 
oil should be brought ashore as soon as possible - was this Govern­
ment policy or was it that oil should be brought ashore by a 
British-based industry and technology as quickly as possible? There 
is an important difference which was not made clear.
The developers, possibly seeing that on purely planning considera­
tions their proposals were tendentious, had thus sought to bring the 
discussion of wider issues out into the open and within the scope 
of the inquiry. In less exceptional cases these issues are reserved 
for consideration by the Secretary of State.
A source of some confusion at the inquiry was the interchangeable 
use of two incomplete sets of technical data (one for Mowlem* s 
"Condeep" and one for Taylor Woodrow's design) at a stage when it 
had not been decided which design would be used if planning permission 
was obtained. Stubbs, the Chief Engineer for Taylor Woodrow, 
admitted under cross-examination that Taylor Woodrow were not in 
possession of the design details of "Condeep" nor had he communicated 
with Mowlems about the design. The majority of the general technical 
evidence was provided by employees and consultants of Taylor Woodrow. 
The bulk of the evidence on platforms, their requirements and 
characteristics was related to the "Condeep" design. Such situations 
compounded uncertainty.
If the developers were going to apply to construct a particular 
type of platform in a site of doubtful suitability in planning 
terms then they had to establish that the platforms would be 
attractive to the oil companies; That if they did develop the 
site, they would attract orders.
The collated advantages they put forward for concrete platforms 
and "Condeep" in particular:
1. They could be used beyond the maximum depth for steel platforms 
of 300-450 feet. "Condeep" is suitable for depths up to 600 feet.
2. A steel platform had to be attached to the seabed by piles and 
the deeper the sea the greater the size of piling and the greater 
the difficulty of doing so especially in North Sea water, whereas 
"Condeep" could be placed in the sea-bed without difficulty.
3. Steel platforms are susceptible to corrosion and fatigue. They
have a complex jointing system which demands a high degree of skilled 
workmanship - particularly welders who are in short supply.
4. Concrete is more tolerant to abuse and less complex to work.
At greater depth concrete platforms use proportionally less material 
and are consequently quicker and cheaper to construct.
3* Steel platforms at present depend on special quality imported
steel. Reinforcing for concrete is more readily available in
this country.
6. "Condeep" design can be modified for either hard-bed or soft- 
bed conditions. The appropriate design will overcome instability, 
scour and displacement problems.
7. "Conductors" which carry oil in a steel structure from the sea 
bed to the platform are exposed to the sea and also to fatigue, 
which is not the case with "Condeep".
8. The concrete spheres in the "Condeep" structure can be used to 
store 800,000-1,000,000 barrels of oil. Steel structures have no 
such facility.
9. The concrete platform can be constructed entirely in sheltered 
water. The superstructure of a steel structure must be attached in 
open sea at the oilfield.
10. The "Condeep" design is accepted by the Department of 
Energy as an approved design. It is recognised by "Norske 
Veritas", a certification authority, and is acceptable to the 
insurance companies.
The National Trust accepted that Condeep was a good design but 
stressed that no oil company had come forward to say so. The 
applicants stressed that implicitly they had been supported by the 
oil companies - two Condeeps had been bought already. National 
Trust countered that the two already ordered were of the "hard 
bottom" variety. Mowlems were proposing to build the first of the 
"soft bottom" design. National Trust stated that Condeep was not 
the only design and there was no inherent reason why the U.K. should 
build the Condeep.
The applicants attempted to establish that their design was 
superior to others for deep water and soft sea-bed conditions.
This was not easy as no Condeep for such conditions had yet been 
constructed. The objectors stated that steel structures could 
operate in soft-bottom conditions because they used piling. Other 
concrete structures could also reach depths of 300 feet. McAlpine 
with an order after the Brent field had said they could construct 
at Ardyne Point for 300 feet or more. Taylor Woodrow's designer 
stated that he could go to 550 feet with the Alness site where the 
draught was only 60 feet.
How long would it be before a new type of platform which was not 
so demanding on its construction site was developed? Mr Bullock of 
the Department of Energy stated that he could not predict
more than five years ahead because of this, yet the applicants, as 
will be shown later, were anxious to demonstrate the feasibility 
of such a site for 10-13 years. The National Trust presented an 
"expert" to the inquiry who was working at the time on a buoyancy 
rather than gravity structure. Condeep was far from permanent.
Yet in the closing submission for Mowlem it was suggested that a 
Condeep site at Loch Carron was likely to last 30-40 years.
The applicants sought to justify their choice of site. The design 
had been chosen then a search had been made of those sites which 
had deep water and provision for relatively easy movement of 
construction material into the area. They emphasised the choice 
of Drumbuie was dictated by the requirements of the production 
platform. The requirements of the Condeep design were about 20 
acres of flat land at stage 1, a depth of water of 5 fathoms from 
stage 1 to stage 2, a depth of 40 fathoms at stage 2 and a depth 
of 100 fathoms at stage 3* The special requirement of 100 fathoms 
was to allow a testing of the ballast chambers in a submergence test 
and to allow the platform superstructure and modules to be fixed 
into the base. It is also important that the stages should be 
close together. If the distance between stages 1 and 2 was in 
excess of 10 miles it wa$ considered that it would be necessary to 
establish completely separate facilities and this would result in 
an "unnecessary" duplication possibly adding £200,000 to the cost.
The proximity of all three stages at Drumbuie was thought to be 
crucial if the site was to be competitive with its Norwegian 
counterparts. The difficult requirement of Condeep was, according 
to the applicants, the need for a 45 fathom "tow-out" channel - which 
was found in the Inner Sound of Raasay. There are only two sites in 
Great Britain which satisfy these requirements: Loch Carron area and
Loch Hoorn, to the south, but the developers favoured Loch Carron and 
Port Cam in particular principally because of the railway. Thus 
when cross-examined by the Dean of Faculty (Counsel for the National 
Trust) a director of Mowlem said "Our prime consideration in coming 
to this area is the deep water with the sheltered conditions. That 
is the only reason we are seeking to operate in this area. The 
applicants intention to fit the modules onto the superstructure in 
sheltered water was the factor which caused them to apply for the site 
at Port Cam. Otherwise a site in the Clyde estuary would have been 
quite suitable. The other need for deep water, they stated, was 
the oil companies' stipulation of a submergence test, yet under 
cross-examination a consultant engineer for Mowlem stated, contrary 
to a Mowlem director, that no oil company stipulated a submergence 
test.
Other than more usual planning considerations which will be looked 
at shortly, the factor which acted as the focus of objection to the 
proposals for Drumbuie development was the "inalienability" of the 
National Trust land. The developers' opening statement attempted 
to avoid opposition on this point by pointing out that "the inquiry 
was not concerned with the question of ownership" - they only wanted 
to lease the site.
The National Trust pointed out that precedent (Rainbow Wood Farm 
case) had shown that ownership was not important. The criterion was 
whether serious harm would be done to the land. Parliament had 
never taken away National Trust land that had been declared inalien­
able. The Trust itself had alienated land for agricultural and 
housing purposes. This was not thfe same as alienating it for major 
industrial development. It was vested in the Trust for preservation 
and for the benefit of the nation. To take it would be to set a 
dangerous precedent and discourage future donations.
The lack of precedent on the principle of inalienability and the 
degree of suitability attached to the Drumbuie site by the 
applicants encouraged them to counter the proposals of alternative 
sites by attempting to show that Drumbuie was the only site they 
could use.
In the opening statement it was said that"so far as is known to the 
applicants Port Cam is the most suitable site having regard to 
the physical aspects and every other planning aspect which exists 
in the U.K." (Hodgson) The same witness under cross-examination 
the same day on being asked "Might it not be that one approach is 
bo look at the needs of the area and what the area may need - is 
the growth and evolution of industries appropriate to the area's 
scale and needs and existing features?" To which the reply was 
"Our prime consideration in coming to this area, as I think we have 
stated already, is the deep water with sheltered conditions. That 
is the only reason we are seeking this consent to operate in the 
area."
The applicants1 attempt to attribute sound planning principles to 
the development at Drumbuie was shaken. Thereafter this aspect 
of the case involved the applicants and H.I.D.B. attempting to 
show the scale of development was appropriate for the development 
of the area and being challenged by the objectors.
Later Captain Stafford, a marine consultant for the applicants, 
was asked "From the marine point of view do you know of any better 
combination of sites for the purpose of the dry construction, the 
wet construction and the completion of the structure than those 
referred to?" (in the Inner Sound of Raasay) - "Yes. There is one 
locality that is more protected for the stages 1, 2 and 3* There is 
one other locality - that locality is within Loch Hourri'"
The applicants subsequently reduced the effect of this admission: 
there was a lack of rail facilities at Loch Hcam, lack of good 
roads, no infrastructure provision, depths for stage 3 lower than 
in Loch Carron and possible towing problems involved in the journey 
round Skye.
The applicants early statements confined entirely to Port Cam 
and its suitability gave the impression that alternative sites 
had been rejected out of hand as being unsuitable rather than 
through the use of any "rational" selection process. One witness 
saying Loch Hewn was suitable^ to be followed by another who gave 
reasons for its unsuitability, did not enhance the quality of their 
case.
The Clyde Estuary was proposed as an alternative by the objectors. 
The applicants pointed out that the "soft bottom" design they intended 
to build had a "skirt" of 25 metres. The channel in the Clyde was 
35 metres whereas at Drumbuie channel depth was 42 metres. "The 
Condeep could be built on the Clyde for "soft bottom" conditions.
Doors would have to be added to the underside to increase the 
buoyancy. The deck would have to be fitted in the Sound of Raasay 
and the extra arrangements involved in this would amount to a cost 
penalty of £4.02 million per platform." (Dodwell, a director of 
Mowlem) The opening witness for the applicants had said that it 
would be impossible to build Condeeps in the Clyde. The National 
Trust considered that the Clyde was a more suitable place to build 
the platforms - there is existing infrastructure and available 
labour. The extra cost was seen as a penalty which the developers 
should pay to avoid adversely affecting South West Ross with what 
the National Trust saw as incompatible development.
The National Trust stressed the fact that Condeep was not the 
only design for deep water. They exampled the McAlpine development
at Ardyne Point on the Clyde. The applicants admitted that the 
platforms built at this site were "designed to operate in a similar 
depth of water". (Hodgson)
The applicants had attempted to show using the arguments cited 
above that:
(a) it was in the national economic interest to build concrete 
platforms in Britain and
(b) that Condeep was the most acceptable concrete design
(c) that Port Cam was the most suitable site.
If the applicants were to be successful in gaining planning 
permission they had to convince the Secretary of State, through the 
reporter, that not only was there a pressing need for platform 
construction at Port Cam but also that the impact of the proposed 
development on South West Ross would not be intolerable.
If the development was to go ahead at Drumbuie what would be its 
physical, social and economic impact on South West Ross? The 
difficulty of assessing environmental impact accurately is one of 
the main problems facing those who have to evaluate and sanction 
such development. The Secretary of State commissioned an impact 
analysis (Sphere 1973) in an attempt to order theissues to be 
resolved at the inquiry. The study was extensively used by both 
sides and was found to be of value. But how valuable? The study 
was designed as an objective assessment of the impact of the proposed 
development. The two sides of the inquiry with subjective views and 
opinions for or against the development were utilising those parts 
of the evaluation which happened to coincide with their general views 
on the development.
Using the same headings as the Sphere report there follows a 
review of the evidence presented to the inquiry concerning the 
impact of the proposed development.
Physical Intrusion
Noise
The Wilson report suggested that acceptable absolute noise levels 
are 40 dBA in the country during the day and 30 dBA at night and 
that special processes of short duration (e.g. blasting) should not 
exceed 70 dBA. Crawford (an acoustics consultant for the developers) 
after survey testified that at Drumbuie the peak noise from blasting 
etc. would be 64 dBA and that the average daytime level during 
construction would be 40 dBA. He disagreed with Sphere’s estimate 
for construction - 50 dBA. The County Council’s witness submitted 
that the applicants’ had dealt with a subjective matter in an 
objective way. This witness had taken readings of the noise level 
at Drumbuie. They were very low and he pointed out that though 
the Wilson standards may just be met the noise aspect of the 
development impact on such a place would be relatively high.
Visual Impact
On visual impact the applicants agreed with the findings of the 
Sphere report although in their opinion they felt that fears 
expressed in the report were exaggerated. All the evidence on 
this subject was supplied by a consultant of Taylor Woodrow who 
admitted he did not know the relevant details regarding Condeep.
The witness gave evidence on the height of the structures envisaged 
by Taylor Woodrow. At stage 2 close in land the platform would 
reach a height of 108 metres above sea-level. At the Onshore site 
the tallest piece of e^ uipmeiit, the derridks, would reach 30 metres 
above O.D. A witness for Mowlem had given the maximum height at 
stage 2 of a Condeep as 150 metres, 120 metres higher than the 
Taylor Woodrow structure, ^he witness had surveyed the visual 
impact from four selected viewpoints on the peninsula to the south 
of Port Cam. In mitigation he thought that such a large scale
development was more acceptable in a large scale landscape, but 
later said that "Nobody in their right mind would put any structure 
there unless there was some overriding factor". The County Council 
and the National Trust concurred in their objections in that such a 
development was visually intrusive and a "foreign element" in such 
a landscape.
As was the case with the noise factor the impact could be 
objectively assessed and the quantification agreed upon by both 
sides at the inquiry. The problem for the inquiry stemmed from 
the qualitative and subjective assessment of this data. It was 
debate of this type involving opinions on "objective data" which 
greatly extended the inquiry proceedings at this point.
Infrastructure provision
The applicants devoted only a small proportion (two out of fifteen 
witnesses) of their submission to considerations of the infrastruc­
tural requirements of the proposed development. Their strategy 
was consistent with a decision to concentrate on convincing the 
Secretary of State of the need for this particular platform and 
the unique suitability of Port Cam for its construction. However 
the Secretary of State had already indicated the issues he felt 
were within the scope of the public inquiry. The significance 
of this divergence should not be overlooked. Was it the case that 
the applicants, being civil engineers, were not aware of the nature 
of a planning inquiry in the same way that a practising planner 
might be....or was it the case that the applicants had consciously 
attempted to influence the decision making process normally under­
taken at the post-inquiry stage?
Roads
The consultant engaged by Mowlem had also prepared a report in 1971
for the County Council. (Loch Cgrron Traffic Study - Jamieson 
and McKay 1972) He stated that with the increase of tourist 
traffic the northern coast road from Kyle through Plockton to 
Achmore (see map) was scheduled to be improved by the County Council 
at a cost of £415,000. The contractors would undertake to build 
a road from the old A8l at Erbusaig bypassing Drumbuie village 
to Port Cam at a cost to themselves of £500,000. The project would 
generate an increase of traffic (many low weight vehicles including 
personal and organised transport of employees and delivery vans 
of local traders) in the order of 10$. This would mean that the 
Kyle to Erbusaig road and the Erbusaig to Balmacara road would need 
to be improved by the County Council at an estimated cost of £500,000. 
The latter improvements he estimated would have to have been carried 
out within 5 years anyway. He also stated that increased parking 
provision in Kyle would be necessary. This evidence implied a 
total capital cost to the country of £715,000.
The County Surveyor agreed with the applicants? witness that the 
Sphere's estimates on traffic generation were low, amounting to 
about 50$ of their estimates. Because the original estimates for 
road improvements in the area were at 1972 prices and because the 
development would generate heavy traffic in the shape of delivery, 
service and plant vehicles unsuitable to the local roads on account 
of their peat foundations, the Surveyor estimated a greatly increased 
cost of road improvements to the area. He stated that the improve­
ments to the Kyle-Erbusaig-Balmacara road would take three years 
to complete at a cost of £1.05 million. The County Surveyor 
estimated the total cost of public road provision would be £1.465 
million - twice the figure given by the developers. In addition the 
maintenance cost related to snow and ice clearance alone would 
increase for the area by £5,000 per annum. In their closing
submission the applicants complained that the figure by the 
County Surveyor at the inquiry for the improvement to the Drumbuie 
Erbusaig Balmacara road had been three times higher than the 
figure he quoted to them in October 1973* Clearly it would help 
to speed up public inquiries if such "findings of fact" could be 
agreed prior to the inquiry rather than somewhat unnecessarily 
adding to the already numerous contentious issues to be reviewed, 
at the inquiry itself*
Houses
If the work force was to be 700-800 men then the estimated 
requirement for houses would be 150 which Taylor Woodrow had 
undertaken to build. It is estimated that the spin-off and 
multiplier effects of the project would require the County Council 
to provide a further 100 houses at a cost of £1 million* There are 
several problems related to the proposals. An existing housing 
waiting list in South West Ross of 83 persons. BUTEC requires 
hostel accommodation for 50-55 people and a site has not yet been 
found. The Hydro-Electric Board cannot provide electricity within 
2 years for more than an extra 200 houses. A large proportion 
of the sites which had been proposed were on crofting land and 
on land owned by the National Trust. Applications to the Land 
Court prior to residential development are subject to considerable 
delay. The availability of water supplies has become a confused 
issue. The Water Engineer had informed Mowlem that they could be 
assured of adequate supplies for the construction site. He said 
elsewhere that there is sufficient water supplies in the Drumbuie 
area to supply 200 extra houses, only prolonged cross-examination 
and collation of evidence revealed that the water supplies are 
sufficient for either the construction site or the houses, not both.
This issue could have been more conveniently resolved prior to the 
inquiry.
The County Council's policy is to build new council houses on 
poor quality land near existing settlements. The development is 
of a scale that would double the existing population. The County 
Council saw this as undesirable. Crofting land wouldhave to be 
built on. The tourist trade is likely to be adversely affected - 
bed and breakfast accommodation used as lodgings by workers.
The H.I.D.B. supporting the applicants used the resources of its 
planning office to build a case showing necessary extra housing land 
was available; this was refuted by the County Council. One such 
site was owned by the National Trust who intended to feu it.
Another was reserved for BUTEC. Others were either boggy or the 
best crofting land in the area. The County Council opposed the 
use of crofting land for housing on the grounds of the need to 
preserve the traditional socio-economic system. It is interesting 
to note that the H.I.D.B. had used its resources to provide 
information to support the developers' case on an issue that the 
Secretary of State wished to be discussed but on which the applicants 
themselves had not provided a detailed submission. (Are the H.I.D.B. 
acting as unpaid consultants for the applicants^)
Education
The Director of Education based his estimates on the assumption 
that 300 school children would accompany the incomers. He had in 
fact no definite indication from the developers of the likely number. 
The existing primary school accommodation may be adequate according 
to the distribution of the children. But the local secondary school 
would certainly require extending. Demountable units would involve 
a cost of approximately £27,000; a permanent extension would cost 
between £6^,000 and £200,000. The estimated increase in teaching
staff would involve a total cost of £59*000 per annum. He also 
noted that if the spare housing capacity was not available it 
would be very difficult to recruit the extra teachers needed.
Police
The Chief Constable envisaged a necessary increase in the local 
Police Force of two sergeants and ten men in order to give 24- 
hour coverage. The cost of salaries would be £27,000 per year, 
housing £72,000 and equipment £7,000. The applicants questioned 
the intention to increase the force by that amount; citing Inver- 
gordon as an example. The County Council recognised Invergordon 
as a permanent development with a stable workforce well integrated 
in the local community. Port Cam would be temporary, likely to 
employ a large number of single men and generally they felt was 
more analogous to the development at Nigg Bay which had required 
a similar increase in the local police force.
Medical Services
The local medical services were already used to capacity. The 
applicants undertook to provide first aid facilities with full time 
staff and contribute to the expansion of the local hospital at 
Broadford.
Overall the County Council estimated that the project would 
require capital investment of £3 million, and over £90,000 a year 
in running costs. The local authority were concerned that the 
increased rate revenue accruing from the development would not 
meet the cost of the expenditure they would be required to make.
Social Impact
The factors considered above are the more quantifiable aspects 
of what may be loosely labelled the infrastructure impact of the 
development. The effects of the proposed development on the local 
community and the "culture" of the area do not lend themselves to
quantitative assessment.' The Sphere report reviewed the effects of 
the development in these areas . However, it could only, or perhaps 
even should only, be a qualitative assessment; as such it was openly 
subjective. Discussion on disputed "fact" may more easily be 
limited by the reporter but discussion of aspects of the develop­
ment not lending themselves to quantification concurred or diverged 
depending upon opinion and difference of reference points themselves 
depending on different values, goals and ideologies. The Sphere 
reportte findings were used in discussion on these matters but 
only as a starting point. The debate was open ended in fact. A 
considerable amount of time was spent at the inquiry on this type 
of discussion; the parties involved came nowhere near to even 
agreeing to differ on certain specific points. To avoid lengthy 
reiteration limiting the discussion to preliminary airing of 
views the reporter must be prepared to act as an effective chairman. 
At Drumbuie this was not done. Consequently the inquiry itself was 
seen by many even some of those participating to be unnecessarily 
long and repetitive. It is the reporter who must weigh up the 
arguments at the end of the inquiry rather than allow the parties to 
attempt to do this for. him during the hearing.
The applicants engaged a Professor of Urban and-Regional Planning 
sind two planning consultants to present this more elusive qualitative 
side of their case but there was no consistency and no rigour 
inherent in their contributions.
The two consultants attempted to divert attention from examining 
the effects of the development on the immediate hinterland of Port 
Cam. "The proposals were inappropriate in scale and job diversi­
fication for South West Ross if the area was looked at in isolation 
but we are required to look at the proposal in the context of the 
Highlands of Scotland as a whole."
One of the consultants attempted to develop an analogy between 
the proposed development and the North of Scotland Hydro Electric 
Board, capital projects undertaken in remote parts of the Highlands. 
Several studies had been done on' these N.S.H.E.B. projects showing 
that they had had no adverse impact upon the local community. 
Objectors pointed out that in these projects the labour force was 
stable (unlike Nigg for example) and that their stay in the area 
was for a definite period. This consultant disagreed with the way 
in which the Sphere reports had set out ways of reducing friction 
without substantially justifying that friction would occur.
Professor Nicols* evidence was particularly discursive. Early in 
his contribution he stated that he would "discourage development at 
Loch Carron except as a last resort." The South West Ross Action 
Group (organisation of local objectors) stated nine main objections 
to the proposals. On their first that the project would "trigger 
industrialisation and subsequent urbanisation of Lochalsh", Nicol 
replied that this was "rather a modest development unlikely to 
have this effect and...in scale with the potential of the area."
He also offered the opinion that the local culture was not as 
fragile as these objectors suggested. On this point the only 
evidence proffered by the applicants were the N.S.H.E.B. reports, 
Aberdeen University’s Study of Invergordon and Stirling University’s 
Study of the Fort William Pulp Mill. The objectors demonstrated 
that the proposed development was of a different nature and certainly 
the Chief Constable’s evidence related to Nigg seemed to support 
this assessment.
The Social Development Officer for the County Council, giving 
evidence on the social and cultural impact of the proposed develop­
ment described the "gemeinschaftlich" attributes of the local 
community. Although Tbnnies has been largely discredited by
sociologists, within this concept a development of the nature and 
scale proposed would trigger profound social change.
Employment Impact
The applicants through various witnesses, notably Mr Martin (a 
"planning" consultant) sought to present the advantages of the 
development on the employment situation. Mr Martin demonstrated 
that the population of the area was imbalanced. In Drumbuie in 
particular although the population was very small 33 f^/° were over 
65 and 339^ were between the ages of 45-64. They concluded that 
as with other remote rural areas the younger people were moving 
away because of lack of opportunity. In this respect, they said, 
the development would have a beneficial effect in the local 
community.
The Assistant County Planning Officer using statistics compiled 
by H.I.D.B. in 1972 countered the applicants’ arguments. At that 
time the potential male labour supply was 22. In January 1974 DHSS 
statistics showed that there were 33 unemployed in South West Ross 
with an addition of 10 in Loch Carron district and 23 in Kylea&in 
area, Gf this total of 66, 40 were likely to be employable though 
not all within daily travelling distance of Drumbuie. The planning 
department had estimated that over the next few years approximately 
170 jobs would be provided in a variety of projects, ; including 
BUTEC, an H.I.D.B. advance factory and an experimental fish farm. 
Although this number of jobs was not guaranteed, the ones thatdid 
materialise would be of a more permanent nature than oil rig 
construction.
Several local businessmen expressed fears of losing their employees 
to the development because of the wage differential that would exist. 
The Forestry Commission was worried about the effects on their
operations. They had already been severely disrupted by the loss 
of foresters to the east coast projects. The Commission had a 
national wage rate which was unable to compete with the pay-rates 
offered by the contractors.
The County Council admitted that there was hidden unemployment in 
South West Ross due to the tendency of youth to move away. But 
very few jobs would be available at Drumbuie to those with a 
higher education. Drumbuie it appeared would solve the problem 
of age imbalance but would probably provide another linked to 
social polarisation.
The project would induce a doubling of the population of South 
West Ross. The County Council feared that the local employment 
structure would become dependent on this one industry and its 
cessation or even temporary discontinuance would cause severe 
economic hardship. They were in favour of economic development 
of South West Ross but preferred to see the introduction of 
several small scale projects.
In closing their submission Ross and Cromarty pointed to the 
problem the inquiry and indeed all planning activity concerned with 
North Sea oil is facing - uncertainty. Thus, "In conclusion the 
advantage or benefit from the site at Port Cam was speculative.
The harm and the cost of it were certain. A certain loss should 
not be preferred to an uncertain gain."
That concludes a review of the case presented by the applicants 
and the counterarguments of the National Trust and the County Council.
An important aspect of the inquiry which may have made' it unique 
was the nature of the involvement of Central Government departments 
and agencies. In the memorandum (St. Andrew House 1958) guiding 
procedure at inquiries Para. 10 states, "The policy of Government 
Departments ia however a matter for which Ministers are responsible 
to Parliament and cannot be dealt with by officials appearing as
witnesses at inquiries. This was not adhered to in the Drumbuie 
inquiry; the partisan nature of the evidence given by the 
Department of Energy in particular gives some insight into the 
importance attached to this development in high places, and 
simultaneously raises questions related to the "openness, fairness 
and impartiality" (Franks report) of public inquiries.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
The increasing importance of energy policy precipitated a 
re-organisation at central government level during the period of 
the inquiry. The responsible ministry now became the Department 
of Energy in succession to the Department of Trade and Industry.
The position of the Department of Energy and its predecessor 
regarding the matters discussed at the inquiry will be looked at 
later in the paper. What concerns us here is the way their case 
was conducted at the inquiry, for it was done so in a way which 
aroused some controversy.
The opening witness for the Department of Energy stated that 
the Department had been .asked by the Scottish Office to give evidence 
on the national economic interest to assist the reporter. The 
Department "saw it as their duty and accepted."
The witness stated that government policy was "to extract the 
oil as quickly as was commercially pmcticable. • • .and to ensure 
through the 0S0 that British industry got as much of the business 
of supplying equipment and services for NSO as possible".
The Department of Energy emphasised that during recent months 
the Balance of Payments had deteriorated and that it was of prime 
importance to avoid spending money abroad. A subsequent witness 
for the Department of Energy after visiting Norway had estimated 
that by 1977 Norway could only build four deep water concrete
gravity platforms on the two sites available. How many of them 
would be needed for work in Norway's own fields is not known, 
but it was established that Norway was in no position to supply 
Britain with more than a couple of platforms by 1980. Norway is ^
the only other country with natural resources suitable for building 
this type of platform which seems to indicate that the effects on 
the Balance of Payments resulting from a refusal to allow Drumbuie 
planning permission would not be as bad as the Department of 
Energy's first witness had suggested.
In a Department of Energy memo produced at the inquiry
there had been no mention of delay in production having
serious consequences. Yet at the inquiry "The National interest 
required that two deep-water platforms a year should be produced 
in the U.K. This was not only in order to save foreign exchange 
but in order to produce oil quickly. The real risk was that if 
Drumbuie was not available oil would flow less readily". Because 
of their conception of the Balance of Payments situation the 
Department of Energy felt that oil should be extracted as quickly 
as possible with British-made equipment.
The Department of Energy extolled the virtues of Condeep in 
their memo for deep water conditions to the virtual exclusion of 
every other type of platform. On what did they base their judgment?
A Department of Energy witness admitted, "I cannot pretend that I 
can answer detailed questions which would imply that we in 
Government do over again the work which extremely experienced 
highly specialised members of the construction companies have 
already done, this is not something that Government can do, but
what we can do is to form an informed judgment on the basis of the
evidence before it." In other words because of their lack of 
technical expertise the Department of Energy was greatly influenced
by what the contractors told them. They appear to have been greatly 
influenced by Mowlems in this case; and the question arises as to 
how far the Department of Energy were presenting the applicants’ 
case for the second time rather than the case of National Economic 
interest.
The Department of Energy's case stated that on the basis of
50.000 barrels a day production per platform to achieve the 
Government’s target of 100 million tons a year by 1980 we would 
need to build famis platforms of which 50% would be of..-the gravity 
design and 50% of that total, i.e. ten, would be for deep water.
They proposed that Drumbuie should become a duplex site capable of 
producing those ten platforms by 1980. The Department of Energy 
was not only supporting the applicants case but attaching greater 
importance to it than the applicants themselves did. No-one stated 
whether these ten deep water gravity platforms for 1980 required to 
be soft bottom or hard bottom designs. This is a crucial question 
for there is nowhere in Great Britain other than Loch Kisharn Carron 
Hcum area where it is possible to complete a soft bottomed gravity 
structure to operate in depths in excess of 500 feet. However it
is possible to complete hard bottomed designs on the Clyde.
McAlpine can build at Ardyne for that depth. Taylor Woodrow's Chief
Designer stated at the inquiry that it was possible to build gravity 
platforms on the Clyde for operation in 550-600 feet of water.
These points are important for they challenge the uniqueness of 
Drumbuie coupled with the uniqueness of Condeep which is the lynch- 
pin of the applicants' case.
A recent civil engineering journal tends to challenge the Depart­
ment of Energy's average platform production of 50,000 barrels a day; 
for many of the more recent designs production can be increased to
100.000 barrels a day. This higher production figure would increase
the average platform production rate and reduce the estimated 
number of platforms required by 1980.
To assist in the presentation of their case the Department of 
Energy commissioned three site selection and feasibility studies 
(Crouch and Hogg Reports 1-3)* These reports were submitted in 
evidence to the inquiry and it may be useful to note here that 
the first report concluded that Loch Hcrara Loch Carron/Kishorn 
and Loch Broom were all suitable for production of the Condeep 
soft-bottom design.
The Department of Energy's case was not well presented at the 
inquiry. There were several contradictions between the opening 
witness and his subordinates. Mr Bullock had stated that 
developers need four times as much land for steel platform sites 
compared with concrete sites. This was corrected to two times. 
Similarly Mr Bullock estimated that within the next twelve months 
15-17 platforms would have to be ordered, whereas a second assess­
ment from this subordinate produced the figure of 11. They were 
not on fundamental points but the inconsistencies were exploited 
by the Dean of Faculty representing the National Trust in a 
successful attempt to reduce the credibility of the Department of 
Energy's case. Certainly Mr Bullock gave the impression of having 
read a brief bn the journey north and little else.
What is the significance of theDepartment of Energy's intervention? 
The stated purpose of any public inquiry is to "inform the Minister's 
mind". Discussion of Government policy is normally conducted by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, the Minister responsible, after 
the inquiry and before he makes his decision. Yet the implications 
of this development for national Government policy were considered 
by the Department of Energy to be so important as to warrant their
discussion of such matters at the inquiry. The Department of Energy 
said they were invited by the Secretary of State for Scotland to 
present their view of Government policy at the hearing. Whether they 
were invited to do so or not is a matter for some speculation; for 
by doing so they encroached upon the Secretary of State for Scotland* 
responsibility for being the sole determiner of the case in the light 
of national considerations, thereby significantly changing the 
nature and stated purpose of public inquiries in this case.
It has been said unofficially by some civil servants that the 
Department of Energy presence at the inquiry caused some conflict 
between various offices within the Department. The nature of 
this conflict is not easy to determine but it appears that various 
offices of the Department in Glasgow were opposed to the development 
of Port Cam and that intervention in the inquiry was initiated and 
carried through by the London office against their wishes.
The Department of Energy*s contribution to the inquiry seemed to 
reflect a feeling that from their consideration of the case the 
need for the development to go ahead was imperative for the imple­
mentation of national energy policy, and that to intervene in this 
way would add weight to the developer's case and ensure the granting 
of planning permission. When so much importance is attached to 
the need to grant planning permission by a government department the 
impartiality of a public inquiry is seriously impaired and the 
credibility of an accepted form of decision making adversely affected 
That the quality of presentation of the Department of Energy's case 
was openly criticised and their admission that technical evidence 
was supplied by the contractors lends weight to the argument that 
they were not motivated to appear as a result of independent assess­
ment of the issues involved but rather being uncritically influenced 
by the information they received from the developers decided to act 
as advocates for Taylor Woodrow and Mowlem.
H.I.D.B
In a letter to Ross County Council of 18th 
October 1973 the H1I.D.B. said "we make no attempt to assess the 
degree of weight which should be given to the national interest 
in oil related matters. Such a weighting of the balance of urgency 
and advantage must be the responsibility of Central Government. We 
confine ourselves to the regional considerations which lie within 
the scope of our remit."
The speed of development on the Moray and Cromarty Firths had 
caused the board to formulate new policies for the West Coast.
They had decided that a "balance of development" was required.
Their plans envisaged an increase in population in South West Ross 
of 4*000 from 2,000 to 6,000. This new level of population would, 
they said, act as a "counterweight" to the increased levels of 
activity on the East coast. There was little evidence to substan­
tiate their assertion that the west coast was like a vacuum.
Certainly young people were moving away but the majority were 
going much farther afield than the east side of the County.
A comparatively large scale development, their Chief Planner said, 
would close "the credibility gap". Professor Nicol considered that 
the infrastructure provided for a large scale development would 
attract smaller industries. However, a local witness with experience 
of the Dunreay development testified the fact that unemployment was 
worse there now than before the project was started and that for 
the first 12-14 years of the reactor's existence no new industry 
had been attracted to the area. The ChaiJman of H.I.D.B. stated 
that "the board thought that small scale industrialisation was 
appropriate for the area. The Drumbuie project was larger than they 
had hoped for but they had been unable to set up small industry."
They must use this project as a means of building up small-scale 
industry. Had the change of policy in South West Ross been 
precipitated by the application more than by events in Easter Ross? 
Certainly the growth point policy in the Kyle Peninsula had not been 
a great success between 1966 and 1973* H.I.D.B. had made grants 
totalling £58,000 to established businessmen in the area with no 
resultant increase in employment.
As has been stated earlier the H.I.D.B. surveyed the South West 
Ross peninsula for land suitable to house the proposed increase in 
population. The results of this search were very much at variance 
with the information held by the County Planning Officer.
The H.I.D.B. also proposed the formation of an ad hoc body to have 
administrative control of the land required for the main projects 
and for the infrastructure, relating them to the needs of other 
industry. Cynically this may be construed as an abdication of their 
stated responsibilities in the area and insurance for continued 
credibility. If after supporting the idea of the development it 
should subsequently fail, they then would be in a position to 
insulate themselves from the failure. This view has been countered 
by a member of the board's staff who stated the H.I.D.B. wanted to 
do the job of the organisation they were suggesting should be set up 
but did not want to be seen as "Empire Builders".
COUNTRYSIDE COMMISSION
This was the third of the Central Government agencies which stayed 
the course of the inquiry. (The Ministry of Defence backed out early 
on after they had seen their objections satisfactorily answered.)
The Commission's chairman stated that their principal aim was to 
develop facilities for the enjoyment of the countryside and more 
generally to "have regard" to balanced social and economic 
development of the countryside.
The Commission objected to the proposed development on three 
grounds:
1. its disruption to the landscape
2. disruption to employment, social structure and quality of 
life
3. disruption caused by such things as the extraction of aggregates 
and the use of roads.
Commenting on the sites that had been proposed Mrs Balfour said 
that they opposed development of Loch Houm - a remote area which should 
be retained as such. Loch Kishorn was less acceptable from the 
scenic and environmental standpoint because of the lack of a 
railway to the site. Loch Hoorn and the Crowlin Islands evoked 
their objection because they thought it wrong to incarcerate the 
work force. The sites suggested Drumbuie was the most acceptable 
but they were nevertheless strongly opposed to its development.
However the Chairman stated that if the development did go ahead 
and as the Department of Energy had proposed there was likely to 
be two sites then the Commission were reluctantly in favour of a 
duplex site at Drumbuie rather than two separate sites in the area.
The inquiry hearing was concluded in Edinburgh on the 11th April 
197*f almost a year after the applications had been formally 
submitted to Ross and Cromarty County Council. The proceedings 
had lasted kj> days, involved 76 witnesses and were estimated to 
have cost a little under £200,000.
The nextb stage of the inquiry was a formal site visit by the 
reporter accompanied by the representatives of the parties involved. 
This took place on May 8th, 9th and 10th.
Thereafter the reporterhad to undertake the mammoth task of
collating the 7^ thousand pages of evidence into a summary report -
Fart I of the inquiry. Part I together with 222 "findings of fact" 
was made available to the parties to the inquiry on May 29th and bn 
June 17th the reporter held a meeting which gave the parties the 
opportunity of making representations if they disagreed with the 
"findings of fact". Issues concerning rateable value were raised 
at this meeting but there was no dispute over the reporter's "findings 
of fact".
The reporter then had to present his report (Part II) to the 
Secretary of State. At no time is there any informal contact 
between the reporter on the one hand and on the other the Secretary 
of State or civil servants from the departments concerned- in this 
case the S.D.D. The inquiry under the chairmanship of the reporter 
provides the verbatim notes of the inquiry proceedings, the summary 
of the proceedings Part I, the findings of fact and Part II as the 
information to "inform the Minister's mind".
In Part II the reporter firstly reviewed the applicants' case - 
he was prepared to accept that Port Cam was the best site from their 
point of view: "Port Cam is outstandingly the best owing to the 
nucleus of available infrastructure, and its consequent relative 
cheapness both to construct and operate". What he could not accept 
was that the Condeep design is an essential part of the oil extraction 
programme. He thought it significant that not one representative 
of any oil company appeared at the inquiry to state that the programme 
would be delayed if the Condeep design could not be built in the U.K. 
or to state how many Condeep-type structures they would require.
He was not satisfied that he was fully informed of Government 
policy. There was a change of Government during the inquiry and a 
significant change in the Balance of Payments position due to the 
increase in theprice of crude, but he said that no evidence was led 
that there was a further change in policy.
It appeared that the reporter had considerable sympathy for the 
objectors' case. On visual amenity he agreed with Mr Graham, the 
applicants' expert on the visual impact of industrial development, 
when he said "No one in their right mind would use the Port Cam site 
for such a project unless there were overriding factors."
On noise he agreed with the applicants that the standards laid down 
in the Wilson report might must be met. But these applied, he 
said, to the public at large. He preferred to apply the standards 
of the Common law of nuisance where noise is measured against the 
standard of comfort in a particular locality. "I am of opinion that 
the inhabitants are likely to be subjected to a nuisance at common 
law as a result of the project."
On assessing the impact of the development on the existing social 
structure the reporter made no effort to disguise his lack of 
impartiality. It is worthwhile quoting him at length. "Into this 
scbne of happiness and innocence it is proposed to introduce 700-800 
men - twice the number of young men in the Kyle Peninsula - whose 
background and life style would be totally different. They would 
largely come from the industrial south and mapy would be concerned 
solely with the earning ofhigh wages and in their expenditure upon 
drink and pleasure of a more primitive kind. In so far as they were 
interested in the local activities I have described, they would tend 
to swamp these activities. As events in Easter Ross have demonstrated 
there would be immorality, crime and drunkenness. Doors would be 
kept locked and children under restraint. The "caste system" 
common in industrial communities would conflict with the outlook of 
the present inhabitants. Sunday working would give offence to many 
of them." It is difficult to reconcile such a statement with the 
stated role of the reporter.
In conclusion on the social effects he stated, "The way of life 
of the present community would not survive the impact of the project 
and would never be the same again. In my opinion this is too high 
a price for 1116 nation to ask of South West Ross even if the 
national interest were more compelling than I have understood it to 
be."
On the economic effect he concluded that even if the project were 
to last for 10-15 years its eventual withdrawal would cause a serious 
drop in local business of all kinds. Moreover it would be unlikely 
that a replacement industry of similar size would find the area 
attractive.
On infrastructure he understood that the project would be in full 
swing within a year whereas the necessary improved infrastructure 
could not be completed for 2 or 3 years after the project had begun.
He came to the conclusion that there was bound to be an intervening 
period of chaos "when the roads would be inadequate to cope with 
the traffic, the housing shortage would be serious, secondary 
education would or might suffer as a result of overcrowding and the 
hospital facilities would be inadequate."
The reporter regarded the inalienability of the National Trust land 
to be a speciality of the case. In Scotland there is no precedent for 
obtaining planning permission in respect of such land. (Perhaps the 
inquiry itself had created precedents.) However he decided it 
appropriate to consider fully the alternative sites proposed (despite 
the fact that the whole decision-making process was concerned with 
determining planning permission on the Port Cam site alone.)
To assist the reporter in his consideration of the alternative 
sites S.D.D. had commissioned a second Sphere report which used the 
"matrix" (developed from the U.S. "leopold matrix"). On this the
reporter said "I regard this system as misleading because the 
weight put by the assessor on each item is entirely subjective; 
the assessor can reach any result which he consciously or uncon­
sciously desires. Further a serious omission from the matrix is 
the element of social and cultural impact. I propose to ignore 
the matrix system." (The contribution of impact analysis to 
public inquiries will be looked at in more detail in a later chapter.) 
He concluded that all of the proposed alternative sites were suitable 
if the value of the existing situation was increased in the trade 
off with contractors requirements.
In conclusion the reporter stated "I feel that far more will 
be lost to the nation by granting planning permission than might 
be lost by refusing it. A certain loss should not be preferred to 
an uncertain gain. I recommend refusal of the applications."
What happens after the submission of the reporter's findings and 
the evidence of the hearing and before the Minister's notification 
of the decision is a matter for some speculation. The actual 
decision making process after the reporter has finished his job is not 
made public. Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, 
in the 196^ Labour Government has given some insight which is 
rather disturbing. "Technically every single planning decision is 
taken personally by the Minister although in fact in nine cases out 
of ten I do not really deal with them. But when one is important 
enough for me to deal with, how do I take the decision? There is 
no law here, no mass of legal precedents - decisions are taken 
basically in terras of common sense personal judgment." Perhaps it 
is the case that not every Secretary of State responsible for 
planning inquiries has the same dilemma but this statement contradicts
the impression given by reports, circulars and memoranda on 
public inquiries which imply that the Minister on the basis of 
the relevant goals and objectives (explicitly derived from 
Government policies) rationally evaluates the evidence presented 
to him by the reporter.
Drumbuie however was a special case. Tfao Secretaries of State 
for Scotland fere in office during the inquiry proceedings and they 
made reference both in the House of Commons and outside it to 
the progress of a public inquiry the outcome of which was to directly 
affect the implementation of Government policy on Energy and the 
Environment. The Secretary of State for Energy took an interest 
in the proceedings; whether he attempted to affect the decision 
in his favour after the inquiry as much as he did during it is not 
known. But overall Crossman's statements point to an extraordinary 
dichotomy inherent in the decision making process. The inquiry 
itself is subject to constant scrutiny. The incidence of the Franks 
Committee and the Dobcy Report (DoE 1975) give some indication 
of the Government's concern to foster the public trust in those 
aspects of planning decision taking they have access to. Whereas 
the actual decision making taking place after the inquiry appears 
to be at best pragmatic.
The Secretary of State for Scotland in his decision letter stated 
that he "has had to take account of the national interest as regards 
the need for oil and the need to secure for the U.K. a significant ^  
place in the market for building oil production platforms."
He disagreed with the findings of the reporter on the following 
points:
1. Effects on Social Structure - did not accept as a general 
argument that the area as a whole would necessarily be incapable of 
absorbing incoming population
2. Impact on Local Economy - did not accept that the likely 
effects on local wage rates and the pattern of economic development 
was in itself an argument for limiting development 
3« Costs of Infrastructure - The reporter had concluded that the 
capital cost of such provision would be in the region of £3 million 
and considered that it was not equitable that contractors should 
be able to acquire such facilities at Port Cam if the ratepayer and 
taxpayer had to contribute such a large proportion of the necessary 
costs. Though the Secretary of State pointed out that this is the 
consequence of any large scale development and would have to be 
accepted if the development was appropriate in other respects.
Rather ambiguously the Secretary of State seemed to be saying 
that any one of the specific grounds of objection proposed by the 
reporter would only become a contribution to an overall objection 
if the other factors considered by the reporter were accepted as 
objectionsi
"After careful consideration of all the aspects of these appli­
cations and of the recommendation of the reporter, the Secretary 
of State has concluded that planning permission should not be 
granted." This statement came at the end of the Minister's decision 
letter of 9th August 197^ - sixteen months after the original appli- 
cationswere placed.
Though that statement marked the end of the inquiry its incidence 
had widespread consequences. The chief criticism of the inquiry 
had been the delay in decision making. Delay was caused by a 
number of circumstances which will be the subject of following 
chapters.
CHAPTER h DECISION MAKING WITH UNCERTAINTY
The Majority of individual criticisms of the Drumbuie Public 
Inquiry were concerned with the amount of time taken by the inquiry 
to run its course. Before any changes can be made to the inquiry 
process which might effectively answer these criticisms it is 
essential to determine the extent to which this delay is due to 
inadequacies in the procedural provisions for a public inquiry 
rather than to other factors.
An initial assessment of the Drumbuie inquiry indicates that 
there are three probable causes of the delay:
(a) Inquiries normally take Government policy as a reference point.
In the Drumbuie inquiry policy itself became a major aspect of 
discussion. (The significance of Government policy for the inquiry 
process will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7«)
(b) The quality and amount of available information may have been 
inadequate, causing prolonged discussion on topics which may- 
otherwise have been more quickly dealt with:
1. The quality and amount of information . .available, particularly 
prior to the inquiry hearing, is important
2. The use of impact studies at public inquiries should be 
considered with a view to making them more effective (see chapter 5)
(c) The established public inquiry procedure may have been unsuitable 
(see conclusion).
This chapter is concerned with the nature of the information 
available for public inquiries and the Drumbuie inquiry in particular; 
and secondly with a review of the suggested feforms to public inquiry 
procedure. Information is the raw material of a public inquiry.
As such information and inquiry procedure ard dependent upon each 
other, for it is unlikely that reforms intended to improve the process
will become effective unless the changes are designed to affect 
both the information flow and the way it is handled by the inquiry 
process.
Dr Francis (Church of Scotland 197*0 considers that the lack of 
comprehensive information being available at the Drumbuie public 
inquiry to be an inevitable situation in the rapidly changing 
circumstances affected by North Sea Oil developments. "Decisions 
involving millions of pounds and many people have to be made with 
incomplete data about the total North Sea potential and its location. 
Inevitably there are periods of policy gestation where premature 
publicity would be of benefit to mainly rivals and speculators. It 
is unfortunate but perhaps inevitable that this periodic reticence 
is sometimes regarded as prevarication." Dr Francis is referring 
to the reticence of developers whose reluctance to provide informa­
tion may stem from the present lack of safeguards in the public
inquiry process available to those who feel they hold information
which should remain confidential.
For different reasons the Chief Planner in the SDD (Lyddon 197*0 
appears to have accepted the situation related to North Sea Oil 
development, where planning is conducted on inadequate information.
He has christened this situation "Planning with Uncertainty". This 
uncertainty is based, he states, on a rapidly changing situation 
which affects and is affected by:
(a) the rate of development
(b) the burden on communities
(c) the changing economic significance of oil
(d) the scope of development
(e) secondary effects
With direct relevance to the Drumbuie applications Lyddon feels 
that planners working in such a situation have great difficulty in
assessing the balance of effects of depopulation versus industrial­
isation. The assessment of this balance may be seen to be the fiub 
of the problem dealt with by the Drumbuie inquiry. How can public 
inquiries be run effectively if this is the state of affairs?
Dobbie (Department of Town and Regional Planning dissertation 1973) 
suggests that these characteristics of oil related development require 
changes in the planning process in an attempt to reduce the 
uncertainty and improve the quality of decision taking. She suggests:
(a) Explicit national and local strategy plans
(b) Flexibility to cope with new demands
(c) Speed up of decisions including a more positive policy
To some extent (b) contradicts (a) and it is one of the main 
assumptions of this paper that improvements in explicit Government 
policy on oil related development will in themselves bring about a 
speeding up of decisions.
Lyddon also felt that the length of time decision taking involves 
on oil related development is crucial because "It can be costed 
directly in terms of adverse effects on the Balance of Payments."
Lyddon, therefore, sees two problems concerning planning decisions 
related to North Sea Oil development: uncertainty and time taken 
to reach decisions. If we accept that these two problems are 
interrelated - in that if uncertainty is reduced then the time taken 
will be reduced - the problem then becomes one of attempting to 
understand the components of this uncertainty. .With a greater 
understanding of uncertainty the concept of planning with uncertainty 
may become less problematidal.
Friend and Jessop (1969) see the concept of uncertainty in 
strategic decision making as having three components:
"1* Uncertainties in knowledge of the external planning environment 
including all uncertainties relating to the structure of the world
external to the decision making system in the local government 
context/£his may be seen as including the entire physical, social 
and economic environment of the local authority concerned, and also 
all uncertainties relating to expected patterns of future change in 
this environment and to its expected responses to any future 
intervention by the decision making system.
2. Uncertainties as to the appropriate value .judgments including 
all uncertainties relating to the relative degrees of importance 
the decision makers ought to attach to any expected consequences 
of their choice which cannot be related to each other through an 
unambiguous common scale - either because the consequences are of 
a fundamentally different nature or because they affect different 
sections of the community or because they concern different periods 
of future time.
3. Uncertainties as to future intervention in related fields of 
choice including all uncertainties relating to the choices which 
might in future be taken within the decision making system itself, 
in respect of other fields of discretion beyond the limited problem 
which is currently under consideration."
Response 1 
"We need more research" 
(Component 1 above)
Response 2 
"We need more 
policy guidance" 
(Component 2 above)
Difficulty in 
choosing alternatives
Response 3
 "We need more
co-ordination" 
(Component 3 above)
Fig. 1
It has been argued above that delay in public inquiry decision 
making (especially related to oil development) is caused by a scarcity 
of information and that the quality of that information is severely
affected by uncertainty. If the components of uncertainty in 
strategic decision making distinguished by Friend and Jessop are 
accepted, then it may be seen that if the responses outlined in 
Fig. 1 (above) are followed there will be at least a containment of 
uncertainty which will indirectly contribute to a reduction in the 
time taken by the public inquiry process. Response 1 may involve 
the commissioning of an impact study (see chapter 5). Response 2 
may lead to an improvement of local and central government strategies 
and policies, and a greater degree of explicitness. So that those 
who are involved in a public inquiry are clearly aware firstly of 
the policy guidelines within the context of which the inquiry 
operates and secondly the criteria to which the inquiry should refer, 
(see chapter 6). Response 3 within the field of strategic decision 
making relates to the factors a Secretary of State must take into 
account when he is faced with a series of public inquiry decisions 
affecting a particular region. Within the scope of a particular 
public inquiry, however, this type of uncertainty may be reduced 
by a full exchange of available information by all the parties to 
the inquiry. Proposals to effect such change will be the subject 
of the next part of this chapter.
Well before the Drumbuie inquiry the Government had begun to 
realise that the changes to the public inquiry system introduced 
after the Franks report had not answered all the criticisms. The 
Select Committee on Scottish Affairs 197'1-1972 session (Land Resource 
use in Scotland Volume I paragraphs 192-214) accepted that problems 
were being exacerbated by the delay in public inquiry procedure. In 
1973 a White Paper (Cmnd 5428) recommended that a committee should 
be set up to examine the existing inquiry procedures and to recom­
mend how they could be strengthened. It continued "Government 
accepts that inquiries take too long and they are intensifying their
efforts to expedite decisions. In the Government's view the most 
significant improvement would be achieved by the circulation of 
written evidence in advance of the inquiry and brevity in all 
expressions and cross-examination at the Inquiry."
The recommendation of the White Paper was taken up in October 1973- 
Dob ry was appointed to conduct a review of the whole of the Devel­
opment Control System (HMSO 1974). Dobry saw development control 
as "the most important of all instruments of planning." Dobry's 
conception of the role of development control drew criticism from 
those planners who regard development control as a negative aspect 
of planning - dependent for its effective function on the much more 
important plan and policy formulation. "He (Dobry) regards the 
overloading of the development control procedure not as a condemna­
tion of the present state of planning to be urgently remedied by 
the motivation of its positive instruments but as.a given condition 
to be alleviated by changes in that procedure, some of which would 
not be necessary and could not be justified if it were required to 
deal with only cases that fall within its legitimate sphere." (Senior 
1974)
Public inquiries are recognised by Dobry as one of the tools of 
development control thus falling within the scope of the review.
Because of the pressure of concern, about delays over applications 
and appeals, Dobry was asked to provide an interim report by the 
beginning of 1974. This first report drew further criticism from 
Senior because it did not concern itself with an evaluation of the 
role of inquiries in planning decision making. Dobry takes this 
criticism and in the final report (HMSO 1975) suggests that Central 
Government should review existing circulars and prepare itself to 
give clear up to date and prompt guidance to local authorities and 
to reporters.
Using Friend and Jessop's tripartite typology of uncertainty this 
chapter is principally concerned with a review of the proposals which 
will provide greater co-ordination. In more general terms it has 
already been stated above that uncertainty stems from a deficiency 
of information. Accordingly Dobry’s recommendations on public 
inquiries will, if implemented, have the effect of increasing the 
information flow at the pre-inquiry stage.
Policy guidance is supplied to reporters in their pre-inquiry 
brief. It consists in part of a summary of central Government 
guidelines (if they are available) applicable to the development 
under consideration. Dobry suggests this guidance should be made 
public. This would help the parties to the inquiry to gain some 
understanding of the policy context within which the development 
will be decided.
Dobry proposes the use of pre-inquiry meetings in significant 
cases for the purpose of:
1. Exchange of documents
2. Agree facts and endeavour to agree what the issues are
3. Draft a proposed programme for the inquiry where appropriate
4. Investigate whether the appeal or some form of the outline in 
dispute can be disposed of consensually.
Such a series of meetings prior to the Drumbuie inquiry may have 
reduced the time taken but to what extent is difficult to say. To 
have all the facts relevant to the submissions available before the 
inquiry may be appropriate in a static situation. But as has been 
stated above the nature of the North Sea oil development contributes 
to uncertainty in the planning process and given even the full co­
operation of the developers, in such a rapidly changing situation it 
may not be feasible to have all the information on which the decision 
is to be based available before the inquiry opens.
In his final report Dobry distinguishes "Class A" and "Class B" 
type planning applications. "Class A" decisions rarely go to inquiry 
and are normally the sort to be settled without complication by the 
local planning authority. "Class B" applications are characterised 
by :
1. proposals which require an impact statement
2. conflict with scale and character of a site’s surroundings
3. provide public concern or controversy on true planning grounds. 
Dobry sees the purpose of impact statements as "to ensure that
the applicant fully appreciates the environmental consequences 
of what he proposes and makes it clear to others" (Impact studies 
which may be seen as a response to Friend and Jessop’s first 
component of uncertainty will be discussed in chapter 5).
Dobry makes six recommendations on the conduct of inquiries into 
"Class B" applications:
1. The inspector should play a more active role, particularly in 
bringing out relevant facts and preventing time being wasted on 
irrelevant and repetitive matters.
2. Inquiries should be less formal and legalistic.
3. Wastage of time for example by cross-examination on matters of 
opinion should be prevented by the Inspector.
k. There is a need to reconcile the objectives of greater speed with 
the fullest participation by the public; To this end interested 
parties should be encouraged to give advance written notice of their 
case and there should be a power used sparingly to require them to 
provide and keep to a "Rule 6 Statement" (see chapter 7)«
5. Local planning authorities "Rule 6 Statements" should be served
five weeks after the appellant's papers are complete and the 
appellant's statements of submissions three weeks thereafter. The 
date for the inquiry should be confirmed at the end of a further two 
weeks.
6. Inspectors should have power to order an exchange of proofs of 
evidence and to order that an attempt be made to agree a statement 
of fact before the inquiry starts.
On a relatively minor point it is difficult to reconcile proposal 
2 (above) with any of the others. Of more important consideration, 
taking Dobry*s proposals for pre-inquiry meetings and for the conduct 
of inquiries together, it appears that if implemented they would 
produce:
1. agreed findings of fact
2. an exchange of proofs of evidence
3. a programme for the inquiry ^
If these factors could be achieved there is no doubt that comparative
time wasting in inquiries such as Drumbuie will be reduced. In 
practice however it may be rather difficult to satisfactorily 
achieve these factors. Uncertainty may well be reduced but because 
of the rapidly changing nature of North Sea Oil development it 
cannot be eliminated. Dobry's proposals attempt to impose a static 
system on the public inquiry. If significant new evidence comes 
to light during the course of the inquiry, credibility will be lost
if attempts are made to ignore it for the sake of administrative
convenience.
SDD circular 14/1975 on public inquiry procedures was produced 
(according to newspaper reports) as a direct result of the criticism 
of the length of time taken by the Drumbuie inquiry. The guidance 
offered in this circular mirrors some of the proposals in Dobry - 
they were both published at the same time (late February 1975)*
Both the circular and Dobry recommend the advance circulation of 
written evidence which will be used to lead evidence. The circular 
mentions the disruption that has been caused in the past by the 
appearance of "new" evidence after the inquiry has started. SDD is
not entirely innocent in this respect. At Drumbuie they circulated 
their second consultant's report midway through the proceedings.
An attempt is made to overcome the reluctance of the oil companies 
to release confidential information before the inquiry. The 
circular suggests that such information should remain confidential 
until the inquiry is started.
On an issue peculiar to Scotland the circular states that those 
involved should "bear in mind that an inquiry into a specific 
proposal for one site cannot turn itself into an inquiry into 
assumed proposals for other sites." If the reporter feels such 
information proffered at the inquiry calls for serious consideration 
then it is up to him to adjourn the inquiry and notify the owner 
of that site.
Public inquiries are primarily intended to gather evidence to 
enable the Secretary of State to make a decision on development at 
a particular site. The consideration of alternative sites as at 
Drumbuie may have been seen as an unnecessary diversion from the 
business of considering thedevelopment and its relation to the 
site at Port Cam. If however the reporter has the opportunity to 
reconvene the inquiry to consider an alternative site when it first 
becomes significant then the experience of Drumbuie (where five 
other sites were inconclusively considered) may be avoided.
The circular recommends the use of a procedural meeting (Dobras 
pre-inquiry meeting) the purpose of which "will be to identify the 
issues, to define the areas of agreement and disagreement between the 
parties and to determine the likely programme of the inquiry." In 
practice such a meeting may not be so tidy. Disagreement between 
parties may not be based upon a consensus framework with differences 
limited to the degree of disagreement. Opposing parties may look 
at the proposed development from dichotomous conceptual frameworks
seeing completely unconnectable issues as being of importance. For 
instance stances taken by the Department of Trade and Industry and 
the Couhtryside Commission - in such circumstances agreed findings 
of fact will be rather difficult to achieve.
The circular "hopes” that all concerned will "lend their support 
to the reporter" to avoid repetitive and irrelevant cross-examination. 
But if the opposing parties are assessing the applicants’ case - on the 
basis of unrelated objectives how is it to be decided when cross- 
examination is irrelevant? Local and central Government policy 
guidelines may have an important role to play in such a situation.
Perhaps as a direct result of the Drumbuie inquiry the circular 
includes a section on intervention by Government Departments,
"Any departmental witness may be cross-examined on matters of feet 
or expert opinion, but the reporter will disallow any questions which 
in his opinion are directed to the merits, as opposed to the facts, 
of Government policy, because the proper place to raise such 
questions is in Parliament," If inquiries are to use Government 
policy as a reference point then it is important that participants 
at an inquiry should know what that policy is; in the case-study 
their only means of acquainting themselves with Government policy 
was to cross examine the Department of Trade and Industry witnesses.
The objectives of the proposed procedural changes to the public 
inquiry process may be seen as facilitating speedier and better 
quality decision making. If we accept that the criticisms of the 
process were triggered by delay caused by an inadequate information, 
then changes to the procedures will not in themselves produce 
improvements which will answer the criticisms. It is important to 
link the procedural changes with attempts to reduce uncertainty by 
improving the information flow. Three specific types of changes
(relating to Friend and Jessop's typology) have been identified:
- impact studies (see chapter 5)
- policy guidelines (see chapter 6)
- full exchange of evidence prior to the inquiry 
which has been considered in this chapter.
If these comprehensive changes to the information flow are imple' 
mented, linked to changes in the inquiry process, uncertainty will 
be contained and delay reduced.
CHAPTER 5 IMPACT STUDIES
Dobry's recommendations for improvement of the public inquiry 
system are intended to affect two distinct but interdependent 
aspects of the process. Firstly general recommendations for imp­
rovement of the procedures; secondly, realising that delay cannot be 
avoided by alteration to the procedure alone but is to a large 
extent dependent upon the quality and availability of information, 
he has made recommendations to effect changes to the information 
flow.
In particular Dobry proposes that in the case of certain appli­
cations (at the discretion of the local planning authority) the 
developer should be required to prepare an impact study. The 
purpose is to ensure that the applicant fully appreciates the 
environmental consequences of what he proposes and makes it clear to 
others. The impact study would be expected to deal with the 
proposed development's effect on:
(a) traffic, roads and public transport
(b) foul and surface water drainage
(c) publicly provided services such as schools
(d) the appearance of the neighbourhood
(e) employment
(f) noise and air pollution 
"Other aspects might include:"
(a) whether the development or its location constitute a hazard 
e.g. fire risk
(b) whether it is likely to trigger off other development
(c) investigation of alternative sites
This study would then be used at the pre-inquiry meeting as a basis 
for discussion hopefully leading to agreed findings of fact.
These proposals raise one very serious consideration. Should 
it in fact be the developer’s responsibility to prepare the 
impact study?
1. The applicants for planning permission are likely to know 
more about the nature of the development but at the same time they 
would also be likely to take the opportunity of presenting their 
case as favourably as possible.
2. The local authority will know more about the environmental and 
planning considerations involved in the proposed development, but 
it is probable that they will be involved in any subsequent public 
inquiry. In such a situation will they prepare an impartial impact 
study?
In view of this potential dilemma and if impact studies are to 
become a regular feature of the more important inquiries is there a 
case for the formation of a section in SDD whose function it would 
be to prepare impact studies? Such a suggestion may itself be open 
to criticism. The Scottish Office providing the reporter and the 
assessment of the reporter’s report for the Minister would also be 
ordering the issues to be raised at the inquiry.
If the parties to the inquiry could agree a remit would the 
criticisms be answered? Impact studies prepared at the request of 
a particular party to the inquiry will reflect the objectives of 
that party, particularly if that study attempted evaluation.
The initial impact study for Drumbuie was commissioned by SDD 
and prepared by a firm of consultants, Sphere. The remit asked 
Sphere ”to analyse the impact of proposals upon the physical 
environment on the surrounding communities, to indicate any planning 
or other conditions that would minimise particular adverse impacts; 
to indicate any matters requiring further study; and to suggest any 
environmental considerations that should be monitored in the event
of planning permission being granted.”
The purpose of the report was to assist Ross and Cromarty County 
Council and the Secretary of State for Scotland to consider the 
planning applications with the fullest possible knowledge of the 
many local implications of the possible developments.
The study, based on information from the developers, the County 
Council, Government Departments and local survey, included a 
description of the proposed project, of the existing situation in 
the South West Ross peninsula under the heads of economic activity, 
infrastructure and social structure, an analysis of the potential 
impacts and general recommendations including planning conditions, 
monitoring, amelioration of adverse impacts and further studies 
which could be made.
At the time preparation of the study was under way even the 
developers were unsure as to which of the two proposals would go 
ahead - Taylor Woodrow to build their design or Mowlem to build 
the "Condeep" type of platform. The analysis of impact was prepared 
on the basis of partial information supplied by both applicants* 
However as the inquiry progressed the developers were required 
to provide more information. Parts of the information on which 
Sphere based their study thus became dated during the inquiry as 
new evidence was brought forward, with the result that some of 
their evaluative work appeared to be distorted.
For example, at the time the Sphere report was prepared no details 
had been supplied by the applicants as to where and in what numbers 
the men would be housed. Consequently the impact study had only 
been able to make a rough estimate on traffic generation. On the 
basis of fuller information on possible housing locations coming 
to light during the inquiry, the County Surveyor estimated that 
double the number of daily journeys quoted in the Sphere report would 
occur. Thus the Sphere estimate on traffic generation appeared 
inaccurate. If impact studies are to be used effectively in future 
inquiries it is essential that those preparing the study should have 
full access to relevant information at the time of preparation. It 
is often the case however that industrialists are reticent about 
revealing company "secrets" for fear of disadvantaging themselves to 
their competitors - the problem of confidentiality must therefore 
be resolved.
The Sphere report was not linked to a series of meetings between 
the parties involved prior to the inquiry. Such meetings could 
have produced agreed findings of fact which would have saved a deal 
of time at the inquiry. Instead the impact analysis merely became 
a reference of issues to be raised at the inquiry - which witnesses 
would acknowledge in their evidence but then proceed to give their 
assessment of the accuracy of the study. Too often the Sphere 
report itself became the subject of discussion.
The Sphere report suggested that five other studies may usefully 
be made:
1. Platform sites - comparative study
2. Social survey - Loch Carron site
3. Economic impact survey of local area 
k. Effects of discontinuous operations 
3* Local employment potential
If impact studies are to be more effective then there is a strong 
case for including in the one study a survey of the economic, 
social, physical and environmental impacts of a proposed development. 
By broadening the scope of impact studies the quality of decision
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making may be improved. But at the same time the other objective 
for instituting impact studies, namely to reduce the time taken 
by public inquiries, may be frustrated. The Sphere study took 68 
man days to complete. Impact studies of broader scope would.take even 
longer (and be proportionately more expensive). If impact studies are 
in the future to contribute to the two objectives of better quality 
decision making and a shortening of the public inquiry process, a 
trade off has to be made at the stage of preparation between the 
scope and sophistication of the impact study on the one hand and 
time taken on the other.
The Drumbuie application was for outline planning permission only.
In such a case, even given full co-operation on information by the 
developers, a detailed impact study will be difficult to produce 
because the applicants themselves may not at the pre-inquiry stage 
have considered all the details of the development, nor are they at 
present required to do so for the purposes of outline planning 
permission. For instance each platform they proposed to build at 
Port Cam would require about 190,000 tons of aggregate. Such a 
resource demand may have more environmental impact than the con­
struction site itself but because the developers were undecided 
about the source of aggregate this issue could not be adequately 
dealt with by the impact study.
To improve the effectiveness of the use of impact studies in the 
public inquiry process there should be:
(a) agreement between the parties to the inquiry on the scope and 
remit of the impact study
(b) a full exchange of information between the parties at the time 
of the preparation of the impact study
(c) a series of meetings prior to the Inquiry hearings to establish 
"agreed findings of fact."
During the week Gordon Cameron was outlining the proposals for the 
"Land Grab Bill" (week ending 1st February 197^ “ see chapter 7)«,
The Secretary of State commissioned a comparative analysis of eight 
potential sites in the Loch Carron area with the intention of pro­
ducing a ranking of sites, paying regard to the environmental point 
of view. The report appeared at the inquiry without warning early 
in March 197^* This is the sort of situation Dobry wishes to avoid. 
The "new" evidence disrupted the inquiry which had to be adjourned 
to give the parties an opportunity to study the report ("Sphere 2"). 
Its appearance also provoked the objectors to request of the 
Secretary of State an abandonment of the inquiry in favour of a 
public inquiry commission.
Following the evidence led by the Department of Energy this second 
Sphere study was carried out on the assumption that two sites would 
be required in the Loch Carron area, possibly a duplex site at Port 
Cam. Such a project they considered would go beyond the threshold 
of additional infrastructure attached to the existing settlements; 
it would require a new village, administered in part by a new 
authority of the type proposed by H.I.D.B.
The analysis included a ranking of the eight sites using a matrix 
analysis. Sphere admitted "The process of drawing up categories 
in the matrix involves a number of fairly arbitrary decisions 
about the relative importance of various factors." Not surprisingly 
the quality of the second Sphere report attracted adverse criticism. 
"A matrix system of assessing the impacts in regard to each alter­
native site was valueless because it could reach any result which 
the person making the impacts desired .... The reporter should 
draw the attention of the Secretary of State to the factors omitted 
and it should be treated as a dangerous document." (Dean of Faculty 
in his closing speech) The Reporter in his report was deeply
suspicious of the subjectivity of the matrix system of analysis and 
decided that he would "propose to ignore the matrix system."
These criticisms raise questions on the methodology employed by 
an impact study. Some aspects of the impact of a development, 
social, cultural and environmental, are not readily quantifiable 
yet there is likely to be an increasing demand for more elaborate 
assessment of impact to reduce undertainty in decision making.
If an impact study, whether evaluating or not, is to be of value 
as the basis for discussion at a pre-inquiry meeting, the techniques 
it employs must be acceptable to all parties. The use (or misuse) 
of the matrix in Sphere 2 for instance seriously reduced the 
credibility and with it the value of this report's contribution to 
the inquiry. There is increasing pressure in the field of decision 
making to push the threshold of quantification further and further 
in attempts to reduce uncertainty. In the preparation of an impact 
analysis a balance of compromise must be struck between credibility 
and the desire to attempt quantification of hitherto qualitatively 
assessed aspects of impact.
There are three main assessment methods open to impact analysis:
(a) Checklist - but these do not show any interaction between action
taken and consequent impact.
(b) Matrices - As in Sphere 2 indicate that interaction exists but
do not adequately indicate the nature or extent of 
the impacts and do not cope with other than first 
order interaction.
(c) Networks - of cause, condition and effect. These are constructed
by relating known examples of adverse impact to the 
condition changes which produced them and then tracing 
these condition changes back to project actions.
The only assessment method used in the Sphere reports was an
adapted version of the Leopold matrix When used in its full form as
it was by the Canadian Joint Federal-Provincial Task Force it
identified 100 different types of impact and 88 environmental
characteristics giving 8800 possible interactions which makes 
assessment a very difficult task. * Sorensen (Sorensen JC 1971) 
accepts that this method indicates the relationship between an 
initial action course and its terminal effects but criticises 
it for its failure to make explicit the whole network of inter­
mediary relationships that exist over this in complex industrial 
development•
Cost Benefit Analysis has frequently been used in the last few 
years in the evaluation of planning proposals but it has severe 
limitations which should be recognised if misuse of the technique 
is to be avoided. Most importantly it is not satisfactory for 
the evaluation of alternative courses of action. The objectives 
under which the costing is being attempted must be made clear. 
Basically the alternatives are either relative to the goal of 
maximising economic efficiency or of maximising economic welfare.
As Hill (1968) states " cost-benefit analysis is more suitable for 
the ranking or comparing of courses of action designed to attain 
roughly the same ends rather than for the testing of the absolute
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desirability of a project. In the Drumbuie context therefore cost 
benefit analysis could have been used to evaluate the various sites 
in the loch Carron area but not to attempt a costing of the two 
alternative courses of action to build or not to build the platform 
site. "Cost benefit analysis gets its plausibility from the use 
of a common monetary standard but the common value of the pound 
derives from exchange situations. Outside such situations common 
values cannot be presfumed' and symbol and reality become easily 
confused. The greater part of the figures used in this type of 
analysis represent national values which will never be adequately 
tested or validated by actual exchanges and which are highly arbitrary 
in the sense that a very wide range of values can be plausibly
predicted, depending upon innumerable opinions and presumptions."
(Self 1970) In a Scottish planning inquiry where alternative sites 
are investigated, cost benefit analysis could be used as a form 
of assessment, but agreement on findings of fact at the preliminary 
meeting may prove very difficult: the environmental lobby is generally 
opposed to any attempt at costing of the environment.
Comprehensive cost benefit analysis is hindered by shortcomings 
in the available information by statistical inadequacies whicfy, 
leading to minor omissions, reduce the acceptability of the analysis.
As with matrices the case for using cost benefit analysis however 
may be strengthened and not weakened if its limitations are openly 
recognised and indeed emphasised.
Despite the present inadequacies in cost benefit analysis and 
matrices for assessment of alternative sites there are no other 
methods of assessment by quantification. Until they are improved or 
more satisfactory methods appear they are useful if only to order 
the issues for consideration and a means of organising the informa­
tion to assist decision making. They may be seen as attempts to
l/
extend the threshold of certainty. If the main obstacle to speedy 
responsible decision making and to rational planning is uncertainty 
then the development of techniques for quantification of assessment 
should not be abandoned.
In the United States "Environmental Impact Statements" have 
become institutionalised and developed to comparatively sophisticated 
level. Since early 1970 the National Environmental Policy Act has 
required that all federal agencies offer evidence that environmental 
considerations have been taken into account when federal projects 
are being funded, planned and designed. Planning in this country 
may be able to draw on their greater experience but a direct appli­
cation of their approach would present several problems.
(a) the complexity of the computer based techniques and network 
matrices in environmental impact statements may be beyond the 
resources of the local planning authorities
(b) detailed technical information is an essential part of the 
analysis in environmental impact statements but how will this 
information, couched in scientific terms, be of use to the layman 
involved in a planning decision
(c) Environmental impact statements on average take eight to nine 
months to process a statement from initial analysis to a final 
E.I.S. Dobry's recommendations are made with a view to speeding 
up the planning process. Impact analyses taking this amount of 
time would frustrate the attainment of Dobry’s objectives.
(d) The cost of E.I.S.s is usually $ 10-50,000. How this would 
be met in the British context is very problematical
(e) The assessment methods reviewed above and used frequently in 
E.I.S.s are concerned with evaluation of alternative sites. Such 
an approach is not easily accommodated within the public inquiry 
process. Public inquiry commissions were devised for the purpose 
of assessing alternative sites, but apart from the Roskill 
commission on which the legislation for instructing public inquiry 
commissions was modelled, they have not been used.
Summary
Delay in decision making on major planning applications has been 
identified as a serious problem. The last chapter has shown that 
this delay may be reduced by changes in the procedure of public 
inquiries. But these changes will not in themselves reduce delay.
A speedier public inquiry is dependent upon the nature, quality and 
availability of information - the inquiries raw material. 
Improvements in the information flow are dependent on two separate 
factors:
1. Explicit government policy and guidance (which will be discussed 
in chapters 6 & 7)
2. The fullest possible information on the proposed development and 
its impact.
To achieve the latter, impact studies and pre-inquiry meetings 
have been recommended by Dobry. But these recommendations raise 
other questions which must be resolved before a more effective 
public inquiry procedure can be achieved.
On Impact Studies
1. Who should prepare them? The developer who knows more about the 
proposals themselves; The local planning authority which knows more 
about the planning considerations; or should a central government 
office be established.
2. Impartiality is a major consideration. If an impact analysis Is 
to be prepared a remit agreed by the parties involved may be satis­
factory. A study which includes sections of evaluation presents 
more serious problems. Evaluation has to be based on objectives.
If the study is prepared by or on behalf of sectional interests the 
objectives, if not made explicit and agreed by the parties to the 
inquiry, are likely to reflect the goals of that sectional interest.
3. Impact studies are expensive. Who should bear the cost?
k. Impact studies are increasingly attempting to quantify hitherto 
qualitatively assessed aspects of the development. To be effective 
the impact study unlike the second Sphere report should temper the 
desire to increase quantification if such approaches reduce the 
credibility of the study for the non-expert at the inquiry. The 
quality of the quantification in the second Sphere report was not 
high. If time and resources are scarce, quality should not be 
sacrificed in attempts to achieve greater sophistication.
On Pre-Inquiry Meetings
1. Dobry envisages a full exchange of information for the pre-inquiry 
meeting. Developers are often concerned about confidential informa­
tion being made available to their competitors. Adequate safeguards 
should be devised to encourage the developers to overcome their 
reluctance to provide information.
2. Dobry proposed the pre-inquiry meeting as a method of reducing 
the delay incurred by traditional public inquiries. If the new 
approach is to be time saving it is crucial that the impact study 
be acceptable to all parties. This will be very difficult to 
achieve.
3. In cases such as the Drumbuie application is it possible to 
have all the information on which to base the inquiry available at 
the pre-inquiry meeting? North Sea Oil Development is a rapidly 
changing situation. New information affecting a proposed development 
may well come to light during the decision making process and 
agreement and findings of fact achieved at the pre-inquiry meeting 
may be invalidated.
CHAPTER 6 DEPARTMENTAL GUIDELINES
As late as the end of 1973 Government Policy on oil development 
was not explicit. This lack of explicitness led to a relatively 
unstructured approach to planning in this field and contributed to 
the delays felt to be inherent in the decision making process.
It can only be inferred that the Conservative Government in power 
during the initial stages of the Drumbuie inquiry favoured a policy 
of flexibility and disposal, permitting contractors to apply for 
planning permission for sites which they thought desirable for their 
purpose. This "dispersal" approach argues that oil technology is 
exploring new ideas and oil companies who are closest to the problem 
should be allowed to dictate the kinds of design for oil platforms 
which they think best and, by implication, to dictate the choice of 
sites which best fit their construction. This approach places the 
initiative with oil companies and contractors who base their decisions 
on platform design and cost.
The Central Government Planning agency in Scotland - the Scottish 
Development Department - however appeared to be increasingly unhappy 
about this state of affairs. The number of applications for oil 
platform construction was increasing rapidly during 1973 and there 
was a strong feeling held by the powerful environmental lobby 
(National Trust and Countryside Commission) that this "dispersal" 
approach did not allow for a proper consideration of the environmental 
issues raised by the Central Government planning agencies continuing 
to allow apparently unco-ordinated growth in the number of platform 
sites on the coast of Scotland.
Consequently prior to the crystallisation of explicit Government 
policy on oil related development in February 197^ (See chapter 7) 
the S.D.D. began to consider the issues raised by the unco-ordinated
policy on oil platform construction sites and to seek improvements.
In April 1973 the SDD produced a discussion paper (SDD 1973) which 
sought to achieve four objectives:
(a) to provide a basis for estimating the number of construction 
yards required by 1985
(b) to classify the civil engineering criteria of construction site 
location
(c) to identify sites before applications came forward
(d) to readia "concensus of opinion" on which locations should be 
preferred for development.
The paper achieved little more than a collation of the readily 
available information on the progress of construction site building 
and forecasts for future demand. The discussion itself was limited 
to forecasts of the future requirements of the industry. There was 
no questioning of the principle apparently adhered to by the Govern­
ment that no consideration should fetand in the way of the contractors 
determining the possible locations of platform sites. At this 
time before policy was to be explicitly developed it appeared that 
planning considerations were of secondary importance, principally 
concerned with the mitigation of the worst effects of a location 
policy dictated by the contractors' requirements. The circumstances 
of such a policy made it difficult for the SDD to provide their 
proper function in this field i.e. advising local authorities through 
guidelines on location policy for construction sites. The SDD 
instead limited their activities, at least in the papers they 
published, to providing information (for instance this discussion 
paper) and to advising local planning authorities on how to handle 
oil-related applications (technical advice notes).
Thus the discussion paper was limited to an attempt to identify
the extent of future demand for oil platforms. It concluded that
though the estimates of the number of platforms required over the 
next ten years (1973-1983) range from 20 to 50 it may well be the 
case that a maximum of 13 platforms a year will be required. Since 
a platform takes 2 years to construct and since "there should be 
some extra sites to allow for competition", the paper suggests it 
would be prudent for forward planning purposes to assume a requirement 
for sites on which some 30 platforms would be under construction at 
a time of peak demand. As a result of investigations undertaken 
during the preparation of the paper some 28 locations were identi­
fied which because of their land and sea characteristics might be 
the subject of proposals by developers. The paper did not consider 
any strategic planning interrelationships between these locations; 
they were independently identified using civil engineering criteria. 
The only rider to this approach was a statement in the conclusions 
to the effect that because these sites might be suitable to the 
developers it does not mean that they would be suitable from other 
points of view.
The paper seemed to accept a need for surplus sites. "It is 
necessary to keep down costs and maintain keen competition amongst 
the constructors seeking to gain the oil companies^1 contracts. For 
this an adequate supply of sites with planning permission is essential 
so that a reasonably sized field is bidding at any one time and so 
that new groups could enter." The paper seemed to be more concerned 
with the requirements of the industry itself rather than with a 
consideration of the wider socio-economic and environmental consider­
ations raised by its arrival in Scotland.
Until the Drumbuie inquiry took place this discussion document was 
the only publication on oil development circulated by the SDD.
The important consideration was that at that time there did not 
exist a widely circulated set of advice notes, interpreting Government
policy on oil related development, which might have given 
developers some indication of whether or not their application 
would be acceptable in planning terms.
As the Drumbuie inquiry was getting under way however there were 
signs that the government was beginning to appreciate the need for 
a more explicit policy on oil related development. In October 1973 
SDD published another discussion paper (SDD 1973a)» the Interim 
Coastal Planning Framework. This paper was exclusively concerned 
with location policy and stated at the outset that, "there are 
likely to be significant benefits in grouping oil developments as 
far as is practicable in order to minimise the environmental impact 
of schemes on the coast and to facilitate economic provision of 
supporting infrastructure and services." Not only was the 
Government beginning to crystallise its policy it also appeared to 
be moving away from the flexible "dispersal" approach in favour of 
"concentration". According to Thompson (197*0 this "concentration" 
approach argues that Scotland should decide which sites are to be 
chosen and insist that only platforms of a design suitable for 
construction at such sites shall be built. This approach shifts 
the initiative and places it with the planners who then decide the 
availability of sites in the light of wider planning considerations.
After survey of the east and south west coasts of Scotland the 
paper identified 1*+ coastal areas where developers may be encouraged 
to search for sites, designated Preferred Development Zones and 23 
coastal areas in which development should be discouraged, designated 
Preferred Conservation Zones. It was suggested that for the Preferred 
Development Zones the local planning authority may draw up "forward 
looking development policies and plans for specific areas where 
development may be acceptable" and that for Preferred Conservation 
Zones which are agreed the local planning authority in conjunction
with the Nature Conservancy and the Countryside Commission should 
draw up Development plan Conservations Policies.
In conclusion the paper conceded that individual developments in 
Conservation Zones cannot be ruled out and that there will be areas 
within Development Zones that should be protected. Four broad 
principles were proposed:
(a) Developers would be expected to look first at the sites in 
Preferred Development Zones
(b) Existence of a Preferred Conservation Zone would put a developer 
on notice that he might encounter difficulty in obtaining permission 
to use a site in that area
(c) Both types of zone would imply that the local planning authority 
had accepted that development plans were required for these areas, 
either by zoning land ahead of demand or by drawing up adequate 
conservation policies
(d) A framework based on these zones would form a basis for further 
adjustment as exploration and discovery develop further.
In August 197** the Labour Government made explicit policy statements 
on oil related development (see chapter 7)» The Drumbuie decision 
was announced and the SDD published the Coastal Planning Framework 
(SDD 197*0. The "concentration” approach had been chosen and for the 
first time the SDD had been able to publish definite guidance derived 
from explicit Government policy. The Coastal Planning Framework 
stated "the Secretary of State will take his decisions on individual 
applications which come before him within the context of these guide­
lines and of the Government's policy for platform sites as put 
forward in Ministerial statements of 12th August 197**-M»
This finalised draft of the Coastal Planning Framework based as 
it was on definite Government policy and on a fuller coastal survey 
was appropriately a much more positively worded document than the
discussion paper. It emphasised the Government's decision to 
follow a policy of "concentration" of sites, preferably in or near 
existing population centres rather than allowing a random prolifer­
ation of sites. It cited four advantages of this approach:
(a) the avoidance of a scatter of industrial development affecting 
many small communities and numerous rural areas
(b) full use of existing labour pools, housing and public services
(c) economic provision of additional services needed for the new 
developments
(d) the possibility of diversification to cushion any subsequent 
decline.
As a result of the fuller coastal survey the number of preferred 
conservation and development zones was changed slightly (to 22 and 16 
respectively). In accordance with the new policy of concentration 
the central belt was singled out as being especially important 
amongst the Preferred Development Zones. "The greater part of the 
Central Belt of Scotland where there is a need to modernise indus­
trial structures and where there is a concentration of resident 
population and support services should be regarded as a series of 
Preferred Development Zones of high priority."
The guidelines also seemed to accept the arguments fielded by 
the objectors at the Drumbuie inquiry. "As such a large proportion 
of the west coast is of importance for conservation and as the whole 
area is of international fame for scenery and tourism the entire area 
has been classified as a Preferred Conservation Zone. Thiswould not 
preclude small scale carefully sited development in suitable locations 
for example service activities and small industry necessary to re­
inforce the local economy and redress the trends of depopulation.
On Conservation Zones in general the paper said "Any intrusion into 
such areas would have to be justified by compelling arguments
including a demonstration that no suitable site existed outside 
a preferred conservation zone.
The Government by this time had gained several years' experience 
in handling oil related applications for planning permission and 
was beginning to formalise its approach. The formulation of 
policy and the guidelines were indicative of the Government's 
move to take the initiative in such development proposals. The 
comparatively unstructures handling of the Drumbuie application 
by Central Government had resulted in heavy criticism of the time 
taken to reach a decision. The Central Government planning 
authorities were now in a better position to assess a developer's 
proposals and process any subsequent application more rapidly.
The developers now had some indication of which locations may be 
acceptable to the planning authorities for any particular project 
they care to propose.
In accordance with the guidelines generated by the Coastal Planning 
Framework several potential sites were identified on the Firth of 
Clyde. Being in a Preferred Development Zone developers were now 
aware that applications for oil rig platform construction sites 
in this area would be comparatively favourably received. Rather 
ironically Mowlems applied in the Autumn of 197*1- to Argyll County 
Council for permission to build Condeep platforms on a site near 
Cam^eltown. Because of the comparatively shallow depths off 
Cam^>eltown compared with Loch Carron Mowlems will only be able to 
build the base of the platform on the Firth of Clyde. This base 
will then be towed to a deep water site (for instance the Inner 
Sound of Raasay) where the platform will be floated onto the base 
before the completed structure is towed to the North Sea. If this 
project goes ahead then in the long term it may be said that Mowlem's 
have compromised their self interest for the Government's perception
of the wider planning considerations. Furthermore applications to 
both build and complete deep water platforms in the Loch Carron area 
based on the necessity for deep water immediately off the construction 
site as a "compelling reason" will no longer be tenable.
CHAPTER 7 THE FORMULATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY AND LEGISLATION
To assist the reporter to assess the evidence given at an inquiry 
and produce his recommendations to the Secretary of State, he is 
given, on appointment, a regional brief prepared by the Scottish 
Office on information colledted from the local planning authority 
and the planning division of the SDD. In the case of Drumbuie this 
brief would have three main sections:
(a) Information on the approved plans of Ross and Cromarty County 
Planning Department as they affect the Kyle Peninsula (chapter l)
(b) Policy guidelines on oil related development prepared by SDD 
(chapter 6)
(c) Central Government policy on North Sea Oil development.
It is the job of the Secretary of State and his staff and not 
the reporter to assess the development in relation to government 
policy. "Section C" however included in the brief to assist the 
reporter to more effectively assess the evidence on an initial basis 
and in particular determine the relevancy of cross-examination.
The reporter's regional brief is not available for public 
inspection, but the confusion over Government policy in the initial 
stages of the inquiry and the lack of ministerial statements at 
that time suggest that explicit government policy on onshore 
development had not yet evolved and that this third section of the 
brief was not very substantial.
The Drumbuie application had created a precedent. This was the 
first application to develop deep water facilities for the construc­
tion of a new type of oil production platform. The only potential 
construction sites with depth of water facilities which would 
satisfy the contractors are situated on the North West coast of 
Scotland. The environmental lobby had fiercely resisted the Drumbuie
application and were likely to object to similar applications for 
sites in an area they regarded as part of the "national heritage."
Until the Drurnbuie application, contractors had been able to 
obtain, without unusual delay in the planning process, the sites 
they wanted for platform construction. The Government may well 
have felt that there was no need for explicit policy consideration 
of onshore development for North Sea oil exploitation if development 
was proceeding quite steadily without any undue conflict of interest 
becoming apparent. Two events however stirred the Government into 
action and induced them to produce explicit policy for onshore 
development. The first was the huge increase in the price of crude 
oil towards the end of 1973 which made the Government decide that to 
avoid a disastrous balance of payments situation they should seek 
to ensure that oil resources in the North Sea should be exploited 
as rapidly as possible. Secondly, this new urgency brought to the c/ 
Government's attention the time taken by applications for major 
industrial development to be processed by the planning machinery.
This length of time became labelled "delay" probably more suitably 
from the applicants' point of view rather than that of the environ­
mental lobby. Rather ironically some of this "delay" may well have 
been caused by uncertainty resulting from the lack of explicit 
policies.
The recognition by the Government that the time taken to process 
planning applications was a problem resulted in two courses of 
action. The first was the appointment of Dobry in September 1973
to review the whole of the Development Control process. The second
was the development of explicit policy and legislation.
This chapter will be concerned with a review of the development of
explicit government policy and legislation from January 197*+ to
February 1975 and a consideration of the implications for the planning
process as a whole.
In the House of Commons on 31st January 197*h two days before the 
announcement of a general election, Gordon Campbell, Secretary of 
State for Scotland, said "The events of last October have completely 
changed the world situation. The threat to Britain’s oil supplies 
and the effect on our Balance of Payments of the sharp increase in 
the price of oil have added immensely to the importance of the North 
Sea oil-fields. It is a matter of extreme national importance that 
we should procure this oil in quantity as soon as possible."
The Conservative Government decided, in view of this assessment 
of the situation, to introduce the "Coastal Sites Bill" which would 
enable the Government to acquire "using an accelerated procedure 
if necessary" land which they considered to be urgently needed for 
certain projects related to the production of off-shore oil and gas.
The Secretary of State made it very clear that the Government 
intended to use the proposed powers to achieve an early start on the 
construction of concrete platforms in the Loch Carron area. "The 
only (area) in the Government’s mind right now is the Loch Carron 
area." (Secretary of State, House of Commons, 31st January 197*0 
Campbell also seemed to have accepted as fact a crucial part of 
the applicants' case three months before the inquiry had even 
finished: "I have pointed out that the type of deep water platform 
in question cannot be constructed in the Clyde area." Such statements 
by a Secretary of State raise important considerations.
(a) they adversely affect the stated principles of openness, 
fairness and impartiality which are theoretically the hallmark of 
public inquiries and thereby redtt.ce the public's confidence in the 
inquiry process.
(b) more importantly a dichotomous approach to decision making is 
being evolved. For certain types of planning applications public 
inquiries are being used and at the same time legislation is being
introduced to cater for such applications by short circuiting the 
planning process.
These points will be reviewed at the end of the chapter.
Events overtook the Conservative bill. Before it was introduced 
there was an election and a labour Government was formed. The first 
debate in the House of Commons on oil came on 2nd April 197*+ when the 
Minister of State at the Scottish Office said that they would not 
be proceeding with legislation on acquisition of sites because the 
Government did not wish to prejudice the Drumbuie inquiry and secondly 
were not convinced that that type of legislation was necessary.
This Government however changed its mind about the necessity of such 
legislation though they did avoid prejudicing the Drumbuie inquiry. 
Three days after the Secretary of State for Scotland, William Ross, 
had announced his decision on Drumbuie, the new Minister of Energy,
Eric Varley, announced the Government's intention to take into public 
ownership five sites on the Scottish Coast for building oil production 
platforms.
The main intention behind this announcement seemed to be to remove 
all possible obstacles to the rapid development of the oil resources. 
The effects on the balance of payments of oil imports were enormous.
The exploibation of the North Sea reserves had become once again a 
matter of extreme emergency. The 197*+ oil import bill was at that time 
expected to be about £3,300 million, an increase of £2,000 million on 
1973.
The Labour party in opposition had criticised the Conservative's 
proposals on the grounds that they were likely to override Scottish 
interests and that they were seriously prejudicing the role of public 
inquiries. Having changed its mind the Labour Government may have been 
expected to weave a difficult line of compromise between the economic 
and environmental considerations. Accordingly Mr Varley's announcement
stated that state ownership would provide firm control against damage 
to the environment and strain on local resources and would also ensure 
that the sites were used to full advantage.
The Offshore Petroleum Development (Scotland) Bill introduced on the 
19th November 197*+ as the embodiment of Government policy on onshore 
development thus had two stated purposes:
1. Short term "to ensure the developments essential to the work of 
getting the oil ashore quickly can take place without delays and that 
they are controlled in a planned and co-ordinated way so that their 
contribution to the national economy is maximised."
2. Long term "it is intended to ensure that developments are regulated 
and controlled in the interests of amenity and general prosperity of 
the areas concerned and that land used for such development can be 
suitably restored when the developments are no longer required."
However the published bill was not concerned with safeguards but 
purely with the speedy acquisition of land for development. In its 
original form the significant sections are:
Clause 1 subsection (l) - "The Secretary of State may acquire by agree­
ment or compulsorily any land in Scotland for any purpose relating to 
exploration for or exploitation of offshore petroleum."
Subsection (5 ) - "A statutory instrument containing an order made 
under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a 
resolution of either House of Parliament." (i.e. a negative control 
over acquisition powers)
Clause 8 subsection (l) - "If it appears to the Secretary of State 
that any land of which possession has been taken under this Act is no 
longer needed for the purposes of this Act, he shall, so far as in his
opinion is reasonably practicable ..... reinstate it or secure its
reinstatement to the condition in which it was before such possession 
was taken."
Schedule 1.3(c) - "The expedited acquisition order (a form of compulsory 
purchase) would be advertised - representations in writing may be made 
within a specified period not ending earlier than 1^ - days from the 
date on which the notice is first published."
Schedule 2.2(1) - "The Secretary of State shall be entitled to enter 
on and take possession of the land specified in the order at any time 
after the expiration of the period of fourteen days beginning with the 
date on which the order comes into operation."
If the bill had been passed unamended the Secretary of State would
be able to acquire land (including land declared to be inalienable) 
lease it to contractors and enable them to start site preparations 
within four weeks. It did not state whether or not planning permission 
would be required.
In its original form the bill aroused serious political controversy.
1. The bill removed all the procedural safeguards which have evolved 
to guard citizens and local communities against the ill-considered 
exercise of public powers. (There will be no obligation to hold an 
inquiry or even give any person a hearing.)
The bill does not require the Secretary of State to give his reasons
for the expedited acquisition at any stage. As Professor Bradley says 
(Scotsman, 23.11.7*+) "How can adequate representations be made on a 
proposal which is not itself explained?"
2. The only safeguard provided by the bill is that an expedited 
acquisition order must be contained in a statutory instrument subject 
to annulment upon resolution of either House of Parliament. Such a 
safeguard is likely to ensure at best a somewhat perfunctory debate in 
the House of Commons, followed by a vote in which Government whips 
are applied.
As the bill passed through the Committee and reading stages several 
important amendments were made. After the report stage of the bill the
clauses and schedules cited above were affected thus:
Clause 1(1) Oil refineries were specifically excluded
(3) The statutory instrument was now subject to a positive 
vote in both Houses of Parliament.
Clause 8 The Secretary of State now had to consult local authorities 
before he decided on the extent of reinstatement.
Schedule 2Cl) Theperiod for representation was extended to 21 days.
Additionally it was made clear that land could not be acquired unless 
it held planning permission for the purpose to which it was to be put.
It was also stated that an expedited acquisition order could not be 
applied to inalienable land.
The processing of the bill has removed some of the more contentious 
points. In particular the inclusion of a bubsection to clause 1 
requiring the land in question to have planning permission may intro­
duce some of the safeguards that were missing from the bill in its 
original form, though it is not made clear how that permission 
will be obtained.
To return to the points raised for consideration earlier in the 
chapter: it appears that the Labour Government, unlike its predecessor, 
was unwilling from the outset to prejudice the outcome of the Drumbuie 
public inquiry. They reserved their comments on onshore development 
for North Sea oil generally until after the Drumbuie decision had 
been announced. This also limited the disruption of the inquiry. 
Campbell's statements at the end of January 197*+ had caused the National 
Trust to threaten that they would put the case before the Parliamentary 
Commissioner and in the meantime seek an abandonment of the inquiry.
The Labour Government's silence on the matter helped to preserve the 
principles of qpenness, fairness and impartiality which are still held 
to be the hallmarks of the public inquiry process.
The actions of both the Labour Government and its predecessor on 
North Sea oil development give some indication of the way Government 
attempts to solve problems. In this case the problem recognised by 
both Governments at various times was a disastrous balance of payments 
deficit, caused by a huge increase in the costs of our imported oil 
supplies. The solution lay in the rapid exploitation of our own resources.
The recognition of the problem and the means of solving it led to 
the generation of explicit government policy on North Sea Oil development. 
The development however led to its embodiment in legislation. Thus 
six months after the installation of the Labour Government there was 
a dichotomous situation:
(a) The basis for a greatly improved public inquiry system for planning 
applications related to North Sea oil development because of the form­
ulation of the SDD guidelines (and more generally because of the work of 
Dobry).
(b) The development of legislation specifically designed to avoid the 
use of public inquiries.
It would appear that a tripartite situation has arisen in which time 
is the chief arbiter and the enemy of the public inquiry process.
(a) public inquiries are accepted by Government when decisions have to 
be made on significant planning applications where time taken to reach 
the decision is unimportant.
(b) when the time taken over such decisions is felt to be too long
by parties to the inquiry and/or Government,ways of speeding the process 
are considered.
(c) when it is felt by Government that the time taken on such decisions 
should be as little as possible ways of avoiding the public inquiry are 
instituted.
Rather paradoxically the safeguards inherent in the public inquiry
process may be considered to be most essential when decisions are 
being taken on significant developments within a rapidly changing 
situation.
Conclusion
It must now be apparent that the Drumbuie inquiry was not a run of 
the mill example of the application of the inquiry process to a 
planning decision. The significance of this decision for the 
national interest (however degined); the number of objections; the 
complexity and scope of the topics discussed; the lack of explicit 
government policy and the partisan intervention of Government depart­
ments - because of these factors the Drumbuie inquiry was perhaps the 
severest test of the inquiry process for many years.
Despite the complexity of the problems the inquiry had to consider 
the only major criticism of this type of decision making was the 
length of time the process involved. To the developer time is of the 
essence. Having made a decision to apply for planning permission he 
feels that the time taken to satisfy the statutory planning process 
involves a severe financial penalty. In such circumstances the word 
delay is attributed by the developer to the inquiry process. Delay 
is not a concept the environmental lobby would attach to the Drumbuie 
inquiry - their primary concern is for the "right" decision, however 
long it takes.
If public inquiries are to retain the credibility and respect they 
enjoy in the eyes of the public it is important that attempts should 
be made to answer the more significant criticisms of the inquiry 
system. The later chapters of "this paper have shown that the time 
a public inquiry takes could be considerably reduced if uncertainty 
inherent in this non-structured form of decision making could at least 
be contained. To this end recommendations for the improvement of the 
system have been outlined:
(a) improvements in the flow of information
(b) procedural change which will take advantage of the more compre­
hensive information available and thereby provide the facilities for 
a more responsible decision.
In the field of north sea oil in particular, the development of in­
explicit government policy and guidelines derived from that policy 
has progressed duripg 197^.
Government policy provides the criteria and the context for the 
decision about which the public inquiry is concerned. The policy 
guidelines derived from that policy will enable all parties to the 
inquiry to gain a greater appreciation of the issues involved and 
the subjects to which the inquiry may refer. These guidelines and 
the proposed pre-inquiry meetings will also give the developer a 
clearer indication of the degree of acceptability of his proposal 
in planning terms and may in certain instances (if for example the 
developer decides to withdraw) avoid the holding of a public inquiry 
altogether.
There appears to be little indication of any widespread feeling that 
in situations such as Drumbuie the appropriate form of decision making 
is not the public inquiry - most effort seems to be towards improving 
the system rather than devising a new one. A public examination of a 
developer's proposals is a safeguard against arbitrary action and when 
these proceedings are open to participation by members of the public 
they guarantee the right of individuals to participate in significant 
planning decisions.
One criticism of the public inquiry process however is that it does 
not by its very nature encourage the layman or local resident to 
participate. The procedural rules it is said have caused public 
inquiries to become over judicialised and have taken on the form of 
a court of law, but the procedure is only there to provide a necessary
framework of order to the proceedings. The criticism gains some 
validity however at these inquiries where "experts" and Counsel are 
present; for then the procedure becomes stricter and more formal and 
cross-examination is sharper. In such cases the inquiry will have 
attracted the attention of national groups who see the significance 
of the subject of the inquiry in national terms. The local laymen 
may be intimidated by the presence of the "big guns" and decide 
against participation. In that sense the Drumbuie inquiry may be 
considered to have been a public national inquiry rather than a public 
local inquiry.
The problem of adequate local representation at a public inquiry 
which has gained national significance is further compounded by the 
time factor. Such inquiries, as the case study has shown, can be *— 
lengthy. The local layman may not be able to afford a prolonged 
absence from work. However if as suggested in chapter 4 an agreed 
programme for the inquiry can be settled, then an individual will know 
exactly when he will be required to attend, rather than having to be 
there for most of the time just in case he is called.
Over recent years public inquiries have tended to range wider and 
deeper; public opposition has become more sophisticated and it is 
becoming increasingly more difficult to confine the subject matter of 
public inquiries within predetermined boundaries. Whereas an inquiry 
would once have examined the objections to a plan, there is now a 
tendency for objectors to attack assumptions underlying a plan. If 
delay is a criticism to be answered then the reasons for improving the 
procedures and strengthening the guidelines are re-inforced by these 
developments.
Two major drawbacks of the Drumbuie inquiry can be identified in 
the light of the case study:
t
(a) its inability to give satisfactory consideration to alternative 
sites
(b) the lack of technical expertise which made the discussion and 
appreciation of technical matters rather difficult. ^
The 1972 Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act provides for the 
setting up of a planning inquiry commission modelled on the pre­
legislative Roskill Commission. Although the procedure is not set 
down in detail the Minister may set up a Commission consisting of 3-5 
members who will evaluate the developers' proposals. If more than 
one site is to be considered a series of individual public inquiries ^ 
may be held. Technical matters may be dealt with by the Commission's 
own research staff. The purpose of a public inquiry commission is 
to consider in general terms how a problem should be solved. Very 
different from the public inquiry which is limited to considering 
whether a particular proposal for a particular site is acceptable. 
Unfortunately the public inquiry commission is likely to be a very 
time-consuming process.
Perhaps the neatest aspect of the public inquiry is that it helps 
to stimulate incremental change in government policy over time. The 
feedback to the Department of the Environment and the Scottish 
Development Department keeps them in touch with public opinions and 
thus influences future policies. The influence as in the Drumbuie ^
case may be obvious and specific, but more often the gradual accruing 
of reports and ministry decision letters will help to form an overall 
appreciation on which future action may be based. The effect is to 
extend the area of Government by the consent of the governed.
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